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ARTICLES 
 
Crisis on the Immigration Bench 
AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE  
Michele Benedetto† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Naing Tun walked into an immigration courtroom 
seeking to remain in the United States, he expected to plead 
his case before a neutral arbiter. Mr. Tun had painstakingly 
compiled documents and gathered witnesses to prove his claim 
for asylum. He had prepared himself to revisit difficult 
memories of the torture and abuse he had suffered under 
government officials in his home country, Burma. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Tun, he appeared before an 
overworked immigration judge who personified the failures 
that exist in United States immigration courts. The 
immigration judge made a series of conclusions regarding Mr. 
Tun’s testimony later found to be erroneous by an appellate 
court.1 The judge also improperly excluded evidence and 
witness testimony submitted by Mr. Tun. Most alarmingly, the 
judge disregarded evidence showing that the court-appointed 
translator did not correctly translate Mr. Tun’s testimony. The 
  
 † Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California. J.D., New York University School of Law. The author once served as a 
judicial intern in a New York City immigration court. I am grateful to Professor 
Anthony Thompson, Professor Philip Schrag, and Professor Andrew Perlman for their 
helpful feedback on earlier drafts. I wish to thank my colleagues at Golden Gate 
University School of Law for their support, particularly Eric Christiansen and David 
Oppenheimer, and research assistants Susana Garcia, Julie Mercer, and Gabriel 
Neises. This article is dedicated to Maryellen and Jim Benedetto, and to the Honorable 
Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., whose service on the federal bench exemplifies the best of 
judicial ethics. 
 1  Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027-29 (8th Cir. 2007).  
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judge then relied on the erroneous translation to deny Mr. 
Tun’s claim for asylum.2  
Mr. Tun possessed the resources to appeal the decision 
of the immigration judge. Without the intervention of the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, who criticized the conduct of 
the immigration judge, Mr. Tun would surely have been 
returned to Burma to face further persecution.3  
Najah Georges Elias faced a similarly challenging 
experience in immigration court. Seeking to avoid removal to 
Iraq, where he believed he would be persecuted for his religion, 
Mr. Elias requested asylum in the United States. During his 
hearing, the immigration judge addressed Mr. Elias in a 
manner later described by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
as “argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes arguably 
insulting.”4 The court noted the immigration judge appeared to 
“badger” Mr. Elias at times during the hearing, “likely making 
[Mr. Elias] more nervous and affecting his testimony.”5 As a 
result of the immigration judge’s hostility and bias toward Mr. 
Elias, the court vacated Mr. Elias’s removal order and 
remanded his case for consideration before a different 
immigration judge.6 As the court stated, “[Mr. Elias] was 
entitled to a fair hearing, but did not receive one.”7 
Mr. Tun’s and Mr. Elias’s experiences represent a 
widespread problem. Legal scholars, appellate judges, 
practitioners, and even the former United States Attorney 
General have expressed growing concern regarding the status 
of the immigration court system.8 As Judge Richard Posner 
noted in 2005, the adjudication of cases by immigration judges 
has “fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”9 
Later that year, the New York Times reported that federal 
  
 2 Id. at 1030. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 5 Id. at 452. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. at 452-53. 
 8 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1; Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response 
 to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006); Benslimane v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005); Memorandum to Immigration Judges  
from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http:// 
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf. 
 9 Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830.  
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appeals courts “repeatedly excoriated” immigration judges for a 
“pattern of biased and incoherent decisions.”10  
Scholars have accurately termed the situation a “crisis” 
and are calling for major structural reforms.11 For example, in 
the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal in Fall 2006, 
Sydenham B. Alexander III outlined evidence showing that 
immigration courts are failing to properly apply the law.12 Mr. 
Alexander proposed a political solution to the problem, 
suggesting the creation of a political campaign designed to 
“force needed changes to the immigration court system.”13 More 
recently, in a Stanford Law Review article, Professors Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag 
analyzed data from asylum offices, immigration courts, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, and the United States Courts of 
Appeal showing remarkable inconsistencies in grant rates for 
asylum decisions among immigration courts, and even among 
judges in the same courthouse.14 Professors Ramji-Nogales, 
Schoenholtz, and Schrag were “troubled” by the ramifications 
of their findings, which indicated an asylum applicant’s case is 
“seriously influenced by a spin of the wheel” assigning his case 
to a particular judge.15  
Additional evidence of the problem can be found in cases 
reviewed by the circuit courts.16 Many immigration judges 
appear to be determining cases in a haphazard manner, with 
decisions influenced more by personal preferences than by 
careful consideration of facts and law.17 As a result, litigants in 
immigration court can no longer be assured of ethical and 
  
 10 Liptak, supra note 8. 
 11 Alexander, supra note 8, at 11; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Eliot 
Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum 
System, 2 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 1 (2007) (“That the American asylum system has 
fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of debate.”); Evelyn H. 
Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 507 (2005). 
 12 Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-36.  
 13 Id. at 45. 
 14 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296, 332.  
 15 Id. at 378. 
 16 See infra Part III.E; see also cases cited infra note 149. 
 17 See, e.g., Sun v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, No. 05-4447, 2007 WL 
2705601 at *3 (2d. Cir. Sept. 14, 2007) (removing an immigration judge from a case 
because her comments to the asylum applicant and her conduct during the hearing 
created “substantial uncertainty as to whether the record below was fairly and reliably 
developed”); see also Nina Bernstein, Judge Who Chastised Weeping Asylum Seeker Is 
Taken Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at B1. 
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accurate decision-making when they present their case to an 
immigration judge. Scholars and reform advocates have 
extensively considered the causes of this problem and the 
resulting surge of appeals to the circuit courts: contributing 
factors include recent structural changes to the immigration 
court system, lack of resources for immigration judges, and 
pressure on judges to decide cases expeditiously.18 When an 
element of the American judicial system is consistently 
adjudicating cases using biased or legally incorrect reasoning, 
the result is indeed a “crisis.”  
The purpose of this article is to suggest a new lens 
through which to examine the crisis in immigration courts: 
judicial ethics. Ethical considerations frequently play a decisive 
role in the resolution of immigration cases, in part because the 
outcomes for litigants in immigration courts can depend almost 
entirely on the attitude of the judge. Accordingly, the 
acknowledged crisis in immigration courts has severe 
implications for judicial ethics. Because the term “judicial 
ethics” encompasses a broad array of principles, this article will 
narrow its focus to bias and incompetence on the part of 
immigration judges in the courtroom.  
Part II considers the unique structure of the 
immigration court, focusing on the current disciplinary 
procedures for immigration judges and Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s “streamlining” reforms of 2003. Part III then 
discusses the existence of an ethical crisis through statistics 
showing inconsistent decisions and cases reviewed by circuit 
courts illustrating judicial bias and incompetence. Part IV next 
examines causes of such conduct and pending solutions to the 
problem. Part IV pays special attention to the Attorney 
General’s proposed “Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges 
and BIA Members.” While some would argue the mere 
existence of this suggested standard of conduct is promising, 
Part IV explains that the new Codes of Conduct lack both 
specificity and enforceability.  
  
 18 The causes of the “surge” in appeals to the circuit courts have been much 
examined by legal scholars. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 9-10; John R.B. 
Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2006-2007); Martin 
S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights While 
Preserving the BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 289 
(2007); Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing Out at the 
BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 2005, 2005-07 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
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This article not only analyzes the existing crisis with an 
eye toward the ethical implications of the challenges facing 
immigration courts, but also offers proposals designed to 
encourage unbiased and competent behavior on the 
immigration bench. Accordingly, Part V recommends practical 
reforms in response to the ethical nature of this crisis. 
Implementation of these reforms will initiate the process of 
restoring the ethical integrity of the immigration bench.  
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM 
A. The Players: Members of the Executive Branch 
Immigration judges and their courtrooms do not operate 
as members of the Judicial Branch of government. Because 
immigration issues often involve “especially sensitive political 
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations,”19 courts 
recognize that the decisions permitting or preventing foreign 
nationals from immigrating are “frequently of a character more 
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive [Branch] 
than to the Judiciary.”20  
Hence, the Executive Branch is responsible for the 
establishment of policy and procedures relating to immigration 
proceedings. This responsibility has been entrusted to the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) since 1940 and is delegated to 
the Attorney General.21 Currently, immigration judges are 
members of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency within the DOJ 
created in 1983.22  
Under authority delegated by the Attorney General, 
EOIR “interprets and administers” immigration law by 
“conducting immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, 
  
 19 INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (noting that it is a sovereign power of government to 
“exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests 
require such exclusion”). 
 20 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); see also Robert M. Cannon, A 
Reevaluation of the Relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act to Asylum 
Hearings: The Ramifications of the American Baptist Churches’ Settlement, 5 ADMIN. 
L.J. 713, 716 (1991). 
 21 See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853 § 327, 54 Stat. 1137, 1150-
51 (1940); see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 8 n.45.  
 22 Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Missions 
and Functions Statement [hereinafter DOJ Mission Statement], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/eoir.htm#content (signed by John Ashcroft Nov. 
19, 2004). 
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and administrative hearings.”23 EOIR includes the Office of the 
Director, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge (“OCIJ”), and the Office of the Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer.24  
The OCIJ manages the fifty-three immigration courts 
located around the country.25 Immigration judges (“IJs”) 
adjudicate individual immigration cases and their decisions are 
usually unpublished oral decisions recorded on tapes.26 The 
Attorney General sets the qualifications and terms of office for 
IJs, who are paid salaries of $109,720 to $149,200.27 The 
majority of judges appointed to the immigration bench in the 
initial years of EOIR’s existence fit the same profile: white, 
male judges in their forties, fifties, or early sixties, who nearly 
all formerly worked for the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) prosecuting immigration cases.28   
B. The Appointment Process  
The appointment process for immigration judges differs 
widely from the process for federal, state, and administrative 
law judges. Federal judges are nominated by the President and 
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.29 In 
addition to public confirmation hearings before members of the 
Senate, federal judicial nominees undergo investigations by the 
FBI, Department of Justice, and the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”).30 Theoretically, this type of vetting process helps to 
ensure that only “ethical” persons become Article III judges, 
thus minimizing the occurrence of unethical behavior on the 
federal bench.31 
  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.  
 25 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 
(2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06771.pdf. 
 26 Alexander, supra note 8, at 9. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Telephone Interview with anonymous former IJ, July 25, 2007 [hereinafter 
Former IJ Interview]. The current immigration bench is more diverse. Id. 
 29 Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary, 
Appendix I: Tiers of Federal Judges—Article III and Statutory Federal Judges, Their 
Numbers, Selection, and Tenure, 95 GEO L.J. 1009, 1015 (2007).  
 30 THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 52 (1989). 
 31 Id. (“[T]he appointment process performs double duty as a mechanism for 
keeping the already corrupt, infirm, or unable person off the bench and as a screen to 
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State judges can be either appointed or elected, 
depending on the process prescribed by the individual state.32 
State judges generally do not undergo confirmation hearings, 
but appointed judges can be subject to approval by designated 
commissions.33  
The selection of administrative law judges (“ALJs”) to 
work in federal agencies is entrusted to the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management. Candidates for ALJ positions must 
meet licensing and experience requirements, and must pass a 
competitive administrative law judge examination to qualify 
for an ALJ position.34 To be considered, an applicant must be a 
licensed attorney with seven years of litigation or 
administrative trial experience. 
In contrast, immigration judges are appointed by the 
Attorney General and act under his control and supervision.35 
Immigration judges traditionally are individuals with 
immigration law expertise, who are chosen through a 
competitive civil service process.36 Those applying for the 
positions are vetted by EOIR, and EOIR’s recommendations 
are forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
where they are usually approved.37 Contrary to the procedure 
for federal judges, the appointment process for immigration 
judges is not subject to a broad system of checks and balances; 
rather, the Executive Branch alone is responsible for the 
appointment of immigration judges. Unlike administrative law 
judges, immigration judges historically have not been required 
to pass a competitive exam to be appointed to the bench.38 
  
select judges who are, at once, independent and committed to the separation of powers 
and federalism.”). 
 32 California state judges, for example, can be appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the commission on judicial appointments, or can be elected through a 
nonpartisan election. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CALIFORNIA: CURRENT 
METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/CA_methods.htm 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
 33 See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SUMMARY OF INITIAL ELECTION 
METHODS, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/SummaryInitialSelection.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2008). 
 34 U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, QUALIFICATION STANDARD  
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE POSITIONS, available at http://www.opm.gov/ 
qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 35 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 n.2.  
 36 See GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 n.6. 
 37 Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships 
Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007.  
 38 Attorney General Gonzales recently directed the EOIR Director to 
“[a]dminister an examination for newly-appointed immigration judges . . . with respect 
to their familiarity with key principles of immigration law before they begin to 
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The appointment process for IJs changed under the 
leadership of Attorney General John Ashcroft and has been 
criticized in recent months for lacking public visibility.39 The 
lack of transparency in the process is an especially important 
issue in light of recent revelations that the Bush 
administration has consistently appointed individuals with 
little or no immigration experience to the immigration bench.40 
There are allegations that Attorney General Ashcroft and his 
successor, Alberto Gonzales, politicized the appointment 
process and promoted the hiring of unqualified individuals, 
even though the DOJ explicitly requires seven years of relevant 
legal experience.41 While testifying before Congress for the 
Department of Justice, former aide to the Attorney General 
Monica Goodling acknowledged that she “evaluated candidates 
based on her perception of their political loyalties” and “asked 
inappropriate questions of many applicants for career jobs at 
the department,” including immigration judge positions.42  
One veteran immigration attorney, who was passed over 
for two judgeships in favor of political friends of the Bush 
administration, has even sued the DOJ for discrimination.43 
Responding to the lawsuit, the DOJ stated that “all but four 
immigration judges chosen . . . from late 2003 to 2006[] were 
hired without public competition.”44 Half of the judges chosen 
since 2004 did not have any immigration experience.45  
In a recently publicized example, a newly appointed 
immigration judge in Lancaster, California, had minimal 
  
adjudicate matters . . . .” Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge [hereinafter Authorities 
Delegated to the Director], 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,677 (Sept. 20, 2007) (codified at 8 
C.F.R. pt. 1003.0(b)(1)(vi) (2007)). 
 39 See, e.g., Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37. 
 40 Id.  
 41 See Scott Horton, Meltdown at DOJ: The Story of the Immigration Judge 
Scam, HARPER’S, May 30, 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/ 
05/hbc-90000186; see also Dan Eggen, Officials Say Justice Dept. Based Hires  
on Politics Before Goodling Tenure, WASH. POST, May 26, 2007, at A2; David Johnston 
& Eric Lipton, Bush Reaffirms His Support for Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007,  
at A17.  
 42 Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37, at *2. Retired IJ Bruce Einhorn, noting 
the shift to politically motivated appointments, stated that “A lot of my colleagues in 
[the immigration] bar seemed to have applications pending for years without ever 
being interviewed while people with contacts at the White House were being appointed 
at warp speed.” Id. at *30. 
 43 Id. at *50 
 44 Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on 
GOP Ties, WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at A1.  
 45 Id.  
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immigration experience when he was appointed to the 
immigration bench; in the nine years prior to his appointment, 
Judge Ted White had worked as a public defender and as an 
administrative law judge.46 Judge White resigned shortly before 
his one-year probation period was completed but not before 
attorneys recognized that “he didn’t really understand the 
law. . . . He often seemed to rely on trial attorneys [i.e., 
government prosecutors] for guidance.”47 In addition to raising 
serious questions about judicial competence, Judge White’s 
appointment highlighted the need for a more visible selection 
process for immigration judges. 
Judges and immigration experts have sharply criticized 
the DOJ for these appointment practices. For example, a 
deputy director from the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association (“AILA”) voiced concern that “when we start seeing 
people who look like [they’re fulfilling] someone’s political debt 
get these positions, it starts to become disturbing.”48  
In response to such criticism, the Attorney General 
changed the appointment process. In April 2007, the DOJ 
implemented a new hiring program requiring “public 
announcements of open positions and detailed evaluations and 
interviews, with a final decision still in the hands of the 
Attorney General.”49 An open appointment process will 
hopefully bring more experienced candidates to these positions, 
and will increase the transparency of the selection process.  
C. Immigration Proceedings 
A fair appointment process for immigration judges is 
particularly important because an IJ often makes the ultimate 
determination of an immigrant’s fate. An individual seeking 
relief from deportation usually enters the murky world of 
immigration law with a “removal proceeding” initiated by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). If a foreign 
national is found to be removable, he may be eligible to apply 
  
 46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Judge Takes Oath in 
Lancaster (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/White.pdf.  
 47 Sandra Hernandez, Immigration Judge’s Sudden Resignation Raises 
Eyebrows, L.A. DAILY J., July 10, 2007, available at www.bibdaily.com/index.cgi (enter 
keyword “pistol” and search in titles for Pistol-Packin’ IJ Abruptly Quits). It was 
revealed after his resignation that Judge White kept handguns and ammunition in his 
judicial chambers, conduct that is prohibited by the DOJ. Id.  
 48 Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44. 
 49 Id.  
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for various forms of discretionary relief, including voluntary 
departure, cancellation of removal, and asylum.50 To avoid 
deportation through discretionary relief, an immigrant must 
prove that he is eligible for such relief under the law and that 
he “deserves such relief as an exercise in discretion.”51  
Proceedings usually result in an evidentiary hearing 
held before an immigration judge, in which the IJ has 
discretion to determine whether the applicant is eligible to 
remain in the United States.52 This hearing is critical for the 
applicant seeking to avoid deportation. For many persons, the 
immigration court hearing represents their only chance to 
present evidence supporting their case.53  
Decisions made by immigration judges are not subject to 
the ordinary procedures of judicial review.54 If either the foreign 
national or the United States disagrees with the immigration 
judge’s determination, they may petition for review with the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA serves as the 
second level of adjudicators within the Department of Justice, 
and issues unpublished but written decisions.55 In 2002, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft restructured the BIA, which 
now has eleven members hearing appeals from decisions 
handed down by immigration judges.56  
BIA decisions may be further appealed to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal. In theory, the Supreme Court could accept a 
petition for certiorari from an immigrant ordered to be 
removed. In practice, however, the Supreme Court has only 
accepted such review in a “handful” of cases.57 Judicial 
impartiality and fair proceedings are therefore especially 
important, particularly for immigrants facing persecution in 
their home countries. A loss in immigration court resulting in 
  
 50 For a description of these forms of discretionary relief, see Executive  
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Forms of Relief from 
Removal (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/ 
ReliefFromRemoval.htm. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 371-2 (2006); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 308-09.  
 53 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 326. 
 54 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power 
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial 
review.”). 
 55 Alexander, supra note 8, at 9. 
 56 DOJ Mission Statement, supra note 22. For a more detailed discussion of 
Ashcroft’s reforms, see infra Part II.E. 
 57 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 310. 
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removal could be a “death sentence for some asylum seekers 
whose cases are wrongly denied.”58 
D. Ashcroft’s Reforms: The Streamlining Regulations  
In the late 1990s, the BIA’s delayed response in 
reviewing removal orders created concern that foreign 
nationals were filing appeals merely to remain longer in the 
United States.59 In 2002 and 2003, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft implemented a series of reforms in an attempt to 
reduce the delays and the backlog of cases in the BIA.60  
One of Ashcroft’s reform measures altered the 
procedures of the BIA appellate process. The standard BIA 
process had operated in a style much like the federal appellate 
courts; BIA members decided cases as three-member panels 
and issued reasoned written opinions.61 Ashcroft’s streamlined 
regulations eliminated the BIA’s three-member panels except 
in a few categories of cases.62 Additionally, the BIA was ordered 
to cease writing opinions and instead issue a single-member 
affirmance without opinion if the IJ’s decision should be 
upheld.63  
As he proclaimed the importance of decreasing the BIA 
backlog, Ashcroft’s reforms went one step further. He 
decreased the number of positions on the BIA from twenty-
three to eleven.64 Although Ashcroft refused to explain what 
criteria he would use to determine which members would be 
removed, he was later criticized for selecting those BIA 
members most likely to rule in favor of foreign nationals for 
removal.65 In fact, “liberal board members appear to have been 
  
 58 Id. at 327.  
 59 Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
 60 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) 
[hereinafter Procedural Reforms]. 
 61 Legomsky, supra note 52, at 375. 
 62 Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,880; see also Legomsky supra 
note 52, at 375. 
 63 Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,885-86, see also Legomsky supra 
note 52, at 375.  
 64 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 352.  
 65 Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376. According to one board member who left 
shortly before the changes occurred, “It was a purge. They brought in people who have 
all worked from one side of the issue, the government perspective.” David Adams, 
Courts Overwhelmed by Immigration Cases, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 2006, 
available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/05/29/Worldandnation/Courts_overwhelmed_ 
by.shtml. This criticism is supported by data showing that the most “liberal” members 
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specifically targeted, as those are the ones that were 
removed.”66 The majority of removed BIA members had prior 
work experience in private practice, immigration advocacy 
organizations, and academia.67  
Ashcroft’s reforms immediately created one desired 
effect: the BIA backlog has significantly diminished. In 2003, 
17% of IJ decisions were appealed to the BIA.68 The percentage 
of BIA appeals has decreased each year since the reforms were 
implemented, and only 9% of decisions were appealed to the 
BIA in 2006.69 The number of “summary affirmances,” in which 
Board members affirm IJ decisions without stating whether 
they agree with the IJ’s reasoning, increased from 3% to 60% in 
a seven-month period during 2002.70 Moreover, BIA members 
increasingly held in favor of the government and against 
  
of the BIA were fired. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376, 376 nn.38, 39 (citing Peter J. 
Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Justicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004)).  
 66 Telephone Interview with Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Immigration Judges (Sept. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Marks Interview]. (The National 
Association of Immigration Judges is a union.) 
 67 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 353. Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales announced in September 2006 that he would add four member positions to 
the BIA. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales 
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html. Notably, 
he “did not suggest that the members who had been appointed under a Democratic 
Administration and removed to other jobs . . . would be restored to the Board.” Ramji-
Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 386-87. 
 68 See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK A2 
(2007) [hereinafter 2006 YEARBOOK], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/ 
fy06syb.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).  
 69 Id. One reason for the decrease in appeals may be recognition on the part 
of litigants that appealing to the BIA will almost inevitably result in an affirmation of 
the IJ’s decision, requiring a subsequent appeal to the Circuit Courts. Without the 
resources to successfully appeal a decision to the Circuit Courts, litigants may be 
choosing not to appeal at all. See Cruz, supra note 11, at 508 (“[M]any immigrants lack 
the financial means to pursue an appeal to the circuit court, to file a motion to 
reconsider, and to litigate upon remand.”). This logic, of course, was part of the goal of 
the streamlining process. 
 70 Alexander, supra note 8, at 12; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT app. 25 
(2003), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf; see also 
Martin S. Krezalek, Note, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights 
While Preserving the BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
277, 279 (2007) (arguing that summary affirmances potentially violate the rights of 
foreign nationals).  
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foreign nationals; Board decisions granting relief to foreign 
nationals fell from 25% to 10%.71  
However, the BIA still suffers from a heavy workload. 
In 2006, the eleven members of the BIA completed 41,479 
appeals.72 According to Chief Judge of the Second Circuit John 
M. Walker, “For the BIA to keep current on its docket, even 
with streamlining so that the disposition is by a single judge, 
each judge must dispose of nearly 4,000 cases a year—or about 
80 per week—a virtually impossible task.”73  
Ashcroft’s reforms have been heavily criticized for 
lessening the quality of work performed by the BIA.74 Indeed, 
immigration judges themselves recognize the problems 
inherent in this limited review process. The President of the 
National Association of Immigration Judges, Dana Leigh 
Marks, noted that many immigration judges were trained to 
render oral decisions from the bench, with no need to “make it 
formal and pretty” because the BIA would serve as the 
“polishers” for the decisions.75 Now, “the BIA is issuing all of 
these affirmances without opinion and we have no resources to 
do a top-notch job from the beginning.”76 
In addition to the structural impact of these reforms, 
the changes raise considerable ethical implications. For 
example, the task of reviewing both the decisions and the 
behavior of immigration judges has fallen on the circuit courts 
because BIA members are less able to thoroughly review IJ 
determinations. But circuit courts were not designed—and 
should not be required—to monitor ethical behavior. The 
  
 71 Alexander, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that “these changes increased by 
thousands the number of noncitizens whose administrative appeals were rejected 
without written explanation”). 
 72 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at S2.  
 73 Statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Apr. 3, 2006,  
at 3 [hereinafter Walker Statement], available at http://www.aila.org/content/ 
default.aspx?docid=18996 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); see also Albathani v. INS, 318 
F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir. 2003) (board member decided 50 cases on October 31, 2002, a 
“rate of one every ten minutes over the course of a nine-hour day”); Alexander, supra 
note 8, at 21. 
 74 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 21. Immigration attorney Kerry Bretz 
remarked, “Motion practice at the BIA is a joke. I get denials where it’s clear they 
haven’t even read the motions.” Mark Hamblett, Extraordinary Measures Reduce 
Circuit’s Immigration Case Backlog, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 2007, at 1.  
 75 Marks Interview, supra note 66.  
 76 Alexander, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing Solomon Moore & Ann M. 
Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts: As Caseloads 
Skyrocket, Judges Blame the Work Done by the Board of Immigration Appeals, L.A. 
TIMES, May 2, 2005, at 1). 
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potential for biased or incompetent behavior has significantly 
increased since circuit courts simply cannot review every 
immigration case for judicial misconduct. 
Ashcroft’s reforms can be credited for bringing the crisis 
in the immigration courts to light: the BIA is no longer 
“cleaning up” immigration judges’ improper decisions, and 
appellate justices and the public are now more aware of the 
wide scope of the problem.77 However, while the reforms may 
indeed raise public consciousness, unethical behavior is 
harming litigants on an ongoing basis. 
E. Current Disciplinary Procedures for Immigration Judges 
Neither the BIA nor the courts of appeal are designed to 
monitor complaints of ethical misconduct in immigration 
courts. In 2003 the EOIR Director established a procedure for 
evaluating behavioral complaints against immigration judges.78 
Under this system, EOIR and the Office of the Chief 
Immigration Judge are responsible for monitoring complaints, 
and complaint reports are “generated on a monthly basis for 
internal use only.”79 The reports are sent to the EOIR Director, 
and are intended to provide a “centralized and comprehensive 
compilation of written and oral complaints” regarding 
immigration judges’ conduct on the bench, as well as the status 
of the complaints.80 Pursuant to this structure, the EOIR 
Director has the responsibility to monitor the patterns of 
misconduct on the part of immigration judges.  
Complaints about the conduct of individual immigration 
judges are brought to the OCIJ orally or in writing, and are 
usually sent to the OCIJ by the Assistant Chief Immigration 
Judge (“ACIJ”) with supervisory authority over the judge in 
question.81 Beginning in 2007, complaints may also be sent to 
the individual serving in the newly created Assistant Chief 
  
 77 Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.  
 78 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 14. Although EOIR and the OCIJ 
established an “Immigration Court Evaluation Program” (“ICEP”) in 1997 to evaluate 
court performance, the individual hearing decisions of judges are “the only aspect of 
court evaluation that are not evaluated.” Id. at 13. The ICEP focuses instead on the 
“courts’ organizational structure, caseload, and workflow processes to assess the 
efficiency of the court in accomplishing its mission.” Id.  
 79 Id at 14.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 15.  
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Immigration Judge for Conduct and Professionalism position.82 
Complaints may be submitted by a variety of persons, 
including “immigrants, the immigrants’ attorneys, DHS trial 
attorneys, other immigration judges, other court staff, OCIJ 
headquarters staff, and others.”83 The OCIJ notifies the EOIR 
Director of a complaint filed against an immigration judge, 
even before the OCIJ has an opportunity to verify the accuracy 
of the claim.84 Thus, the EOIR Director is presumably well-
informed: in addition to receiving monthly compilations of 
written and oral complaints, the EOIR Director is also notified 
of individual complaints as they arise. 
Despite the monitoring role of the EOIR Director, and 
the newly created advisory role of the ACIJ for Conduct and 
Professionalism, the ACIJ with supervisory authority over the 
judge is directly responsible for addressing most complaints.85 
In an August 2006 report, the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) disclosed that between fiscal years 2001 to 2005, 
the OCIJ received 129 complaints against IJs.86 The OCIJ had 
taken 134 actions in response to 121 complaints as of 
September 30, 2005:87  
[A]bout 25 percent (34 [complaints]) were found to have no merit; 
about 25 percent resulted in disciplinary actions against the judges 
that included counseling (18), written reprimand (9), oral reprimand 
(3), and suspension (4); about 22 percent (29) were referred to DOJ’s 
Office of Professional Responsibility or Office of the Inspector 
General or EOIR’s office of General Counsel for further review; and 
the remaining 28 percent (37) resulted in various other actions such 
  
 82 This position, created in 2007 as part of Attorney General Gonzales’s 
reforms, is designed to “review[] and monitor[] all complaints against immigration 
judges” and help “ensure that investigations of complaints are concluded as efficiently 
as possible.” AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, Apr. 11, 2007, at 3 
[hereinafter AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/eoiraila041107.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). Notably, however, the 
ACIJ for Conduct and Professionalism does not hold disciplinary authority over IJs. 
See id. (listing the position’s responsibilities as monitoring, reviewing, and tracking all 
complaints). 
 83 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 27. 
 84 Id. at 28. 
 85 Id. An exception exists for complaints concerning allegations relating to 
the “exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal 
advice.” Id. Such complaints are referred directly to the Office of Professional 
Responsibility, which is responsible for handling such allegations. Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. The remaining eight complaints were still under review. Id. 
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as informing complainants of the Office of Professional 
Responsibility process or their appeal rights to BIA.88  
In light of recent publicity highlighting the prevalence 
of unethical conduct on the part of IJs,89 the fact that only 129 
complaints were filed over a four-year period is somewhat 
startling. In reality, however, EOIR’s administrative complaint 
procedure suffers from several weaknesses.90 These limitations 
may explain the low number of reported complaints. Also, 
recent reforms to the judicial review process for immigration 
cases may have encouraged litigants to file appeals of their 
cases in circuit courts,91 rather than filing disciplinary 
complaints that have no effect on the substantive outcome of a 
litigant’s case. Individuals suffering from biased, incompetent, 
or otherwise unethical behavior on the part of immigration 
judges should have a more effective means of recourse than 
appealing to the circuit courts or relying on the inadequate IJ 
disciplinary process. 
III.  THE EXISTENCE OF AN ETHICAL CRISIS  
A. Judicial Ethics Generally 
The American judicial system is premised upon the 
ability of judges to be ethical and fair. Judges are held to the 
highest standards of professional behavior because of the 
powerful positions they hold.92 The American Bar Association 
published a revised “Model Code of Judicial Conduct” in 
February 2007.93 This Code applies to “anyone who is 
authorized to perform judicial functions;” the newly revised 
code specifically includes justices of the peace, magistrates, 
court commissioners, and members of the administrative 
judiciary within that definition.94  
  
 88 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 28-29. 
 89 See infra Part III.D-E.  
 90  See discussion infra Part IV.C.2. 
 91 See generally sources cited supra note 18.  
 92 JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.01 (3d ed. 
2000).  
 93 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) 
[hereinafter ABA JUDICIAL CODE], available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ 
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
 94 Id., para. I(B) of “Application” section, at 6. The National Conference of 
Administrative Law Judges endorsed a “Model Code of Judicial Conduct” for Federal 
Administrative Law Judges in February 1989.  
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As part of their ethical duties, all judges must make 
competent decisions in an impartial manner, free from personal 
bias or prejudice.95 Even so, judges work with varying degrees 
of competence and are generally somewhat involved in the 
affairs of society at large.  
A judge’s involvement in the “outside world” is not 
necessarily a negative characteristic, for such involvement can 
“enrich[] the judicial temperament and enhance[] a judge’s 
ability to make difficult decisions.”96 In reality, the balance 
between the ideal of judicial impartiality and the reality of 
personal preferences can be difficult to strike. This problem of 
personal bias or prejudice becomes even more nuanced when it 
is held against groups of people; unlike business or financial 
interests, personal bias is subjective and difficult to identify.97  
According to the ABA, the term “bias” is commonly 
understood to indicate favoritism or opposition by a judge to a 
concept or idea, while the term “prejudice” suggests “specially 
favoring or opposing individuals.”98 The ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct specifically prohibits actions manifesting 
either bias or prejudice in the performance of judicial duties.99  
The determination of a judge’s competence can be easier 
to identify than bias. The ABA declared in the 2007 Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct that judicial competence “requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of 
judicial office.”100 One state supreme court established the test 
for incompetence as “whether the conduct at issue establishes 
that the [judge] lacks the requisite ability, knowledge, 
judgment, or diligence to consistently and capably discharge 
the duties of the office he or she holds.”101 Regardless of 
jurisdiction, judges are expected to bring a basic level of 
neutrality, knowledge, skill, and dedication to the cases 
brought before them.  
  
 95 SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.01. 
 96 Id.  
 97 See id. § 4.04. 
 98 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2007, Rule 2.3, Explanation of Comments, cmt. [1], at 16. This 
article will use the term “bias” and “prejudice” in accordance with the ABA definitions.  
 99 ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.3. 
 100 Id. Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].  
 101 In re Baber, 847 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also In re 
Hunter, 823 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2002) (adopting the definition of judicial competence 
used in In re Baber).  
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Accordingly, federal rules, case law, and ethical codes of 
conduct seek to ensure judicial competence, professionalism, 
and impartiality.102 For example, most judges are required to 
disqualify themselves if they hold personal antagonism against 
a party, or hold “[a]nimosity or irrational bias, such as racial 
prejudice,” against a particular group.103 Such beliefs would 
obviously affect the ability of a judge to decide a case 
impartially based only on facts and law, and would undermine 
the judicial system.  
B. Ethical Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges  
Immigration courts in the United States are distinct 
from other courts, and the fact that immigration judges do not 
operate under the judicial branch has serious ethical 
implications. As a unique body of adjudicators, immigration 
judges must follow several codes of conduct. Because they are 
employees of the executive branch, IJs are subject to the 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch.104 In addition, IJs and BIA members must follow the 
Department of Justice Codes of Conduct,105 the EOIR Ethics 
Manual,106 and management policies of both EOIR and the 
DOJ. The DOJ also recently proposed “Codes of Conduct for the 
  
 102 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) (2000) (requiring a federal judge to 
disqualify himself in any case in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.11 (same). Of course, the laws 
and rules governing judicial conduct also address issues of conflicts of interest, ex parte 
communications, and financial disclosures, among other things. Because a thorough 
examination of each of these issues as they relate to IJs is beyond the scope of this 
Article, the focus here is on the issues of bias and competence. 
 103 SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.04. 
 104 These standards are codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635 (2007) and 5 C.F.R. pt. 
3801 (2007). 
 105 The Regulations provide: 
Employees of the Department of Justice are subject to the executive branch-
wide Standards of Ethical Conduct at 5 C.F.R. part 2635, the Department of 
Justice regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 3801 which supplement the executive 
branch-wide standards, the executive branch-wide financial disclosure 
regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 2634 and the executive branch-wide employee 
responsibilities and conduct regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 735. 
28 C.F.R. § 45.1 (2007). 
 106 The Ethics Manual, distributed in 2001, is designed for members of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Judges, and Administrative Law Judges 
Employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. See Executive Office  
for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ethics Manual [hereinafter EOIR Ethics 
Manual], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2008).  
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Immigration Judges and Board Members,” which are not yet in 
final form.107 As an attorney, an IJ is also subject to the rules of 
professional conduct in the state(s) where the IJ is a member of 
the bar and in the state where she performs her duties.108 
Notably, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which is used as a model for most state judicial codes of 
conduct, is not binding on IJs and members of the BIA; rather, 
the ABA Model Code is intended to be “aspirational” for IJs 
and BIA members.109 In addition, the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges is not binding on IJs or BIA members 
because they are not members of the judicial branch.110 
C. The Special Need for Ethical Behavior in Immigration 
Court 
Given so many applicable rules of conduct, the existence 
of an ethical crisis in immigration courts may seem surprising. 
After all, with six to seven sets of rules potentially serving as 
guidance, how could an immigration judge fail to act in an 
ethical manner?  
  
 107 The proposed text of the IJ Codes is published in the Federal Register. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 
Fed. Reg. 35,510-13 (June 28, 2007).  
 108 Id. These various codes of conduct have many parallels, including 
prohibitions against bias and prejudice, conflicts of interest, impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety, and restrictions on extra-judicial activities such as political 
activities. The codes also require a minimum level of competence on the part of judges. 
Cf. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available  
at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_extend.jsp?cid=10158 (last visited Feb. 
20, 2008); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED 
STATES JUDGES (2002) [hereinafter CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
 109 EOIR Ethics Manual, supra note 106, at 1 n.1 (“[T]he Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct is not binding on EOIR Judges, but its canons and commentary 
present aspirational goals.”). The ABA, which published an updated version of the 
Model Code for Judicial Conduct in April 2007, intended the Model Code to apply to 
members of the “administrative law judiciary.” ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, 
Part I(B). Moreover, IJs are not subject to state judicial ethics codes governing state 
judges. While extension of state judicial ethics codes on federal IJs is arguably valid 
under the McDade Amendment, it would add more standards of conduct to the already 
considerable number of codes applicable to them. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2008). As an 
alternative, EOIR should focus on consolidating the ethical guidelines of IJs into one 
comprehensive standard of conduct. See infra Part V.B. 
 110 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges applies to United States 
circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal 
Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES, 
supra note 108, ch. I. The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces have also adopted this Code. Id. 
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In reality, the number of applicable codes is itself 
indicative of a problem: Immigration judges do not have the 
time or resources to review multiple codes of conduct on a 
regular basis. Moreover, actual training in ethics-related issues 
is substantially lacking for immigration judges. One former IJ 
reported that EOIR’s training conferences for immigration 
judges would occasionally include an hour or so related to 
ethics, but there was “certainly no local training of judges on 
ethics issues.”111 In fact, training conferences for immigration 
judges were completely suspended for several years due to 
budgetary constraints.112 During those years, immigration 
judges did not receive any formal ethical training at all. The 
DOJ again suspended training conferences for immigration 
judges in February 2008 due to “budget constraints.”113 
In addition, the heavy workload of immigration judges 
leaves no time for discussions regarding ethical conduct. When 
asked whether immigration judges spoke with each other about 
ethical codes of conduct, a former IJ replied, “Nobody even 
talked about it. The judges I served with didn’t know about 
[ethical codes of conduct]. Their whole focus was on their 
calendar, wondering ‘how am I going to get through these five 
merits hearings I squeezed in today?’”114 With the pressures of 
a busy calendar, guidelines relating to ethical conduct are 
considered a low priority.  
Immigration judges undeniably face a great number of 
challenges in their daily work. With limited resources, they are 
expected to make determinations which are often life-or-death 
decisions for the litigants before them.115 Many cases coming 
  
 111 Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.  
 112 Denise Slavin, President of the National Association of Immigration 
Judges, commented in 2006, “We [IJs] are so low on funds. We haven’t had a break off 
the bench for three years. . . . We have had no training conferences, no cultural 
sensitivity training.” Adams, supra note 65. For recommendations regarding formal 
ethics training for IJs, see infra Part V.B. 
 113  Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, & Denise Noonan Slavin, Vice 
President, National Association of Immigration Judges to Chief Judge David L. Neal, 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter NAIJ Letter] (on file 
with author). Immigration judges protested the cancellation of training for IJs, noting 
that the decision “will impact adversely on the quality of our work” because 
“[c]ontinuous training is essential to maintain any kind of expertise, which we are 
expected to have, in this area of the law.” Id.  
 114 Former IJ Interview, supra note 28. 
 115 As the U.S. Government Accountability Office recognized, IJs must balance 
“adjudicating their caseload (all cases awaiting adjudication) in a timely manner while 
at the same time ensuring that the rights of the immigrants appearing before them are 
protected.” GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 2. 
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before immigration judges involve complex legal or factual 
issues, but, in 2006, only 35% of litigants were represented by 
counsel.116 Relevant evidence is often unavailable, including 
witnesses or documents that could prove persecution in a home 
country.117 Also, only 11.6% of immigration court proceedings in 
the 2006 fiscal year were conducted in English.118 As a result, it 
can be difficult for immigration judges to identify relevant 
issues or make “credibility determinations” to decide whether a 
litigant is telling the truth. The latter point is arguably the 
most important: since immigration judges are responsible for 
the crucial determinations of a litigant’s credibility that often 
decide the case, a litigant’s courtroom demeanor can have a 
substantial impact on the success of his claim.119 
Ashcroft’s streamlining reforms, minimizing judicial 
review of an immigration judge’s opinions, place an even 
greater emphasis on a foreign national’s initial proceeding 
before the IJ. Unless a litigant is financially and practically 
able to appeal a removal order to the circuit courts, a foreign 
national’s ability to stay in the United States essentially lies in 
the hands of the immigration judge.  
For this reason, fair and competent adjudication in 
immigration court proceedings is critical. Indeed, “trivial 
mistakes [in immigration court] can unwittingly lead to flawed 
decisions with grave consequences.”120 Individuals seeking relief 
before an immigration judge must therefore be guaranteed 
  
 116 See 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at A1. 
 117 Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that the “ability to gather evidence 
may be blocked by the very government alleged to be the persecutor”). 
 118 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at F1. In fiscal year 2006, 252 different 
languages were spoken in immigration court proceedings, a nineteen percent increase 
in language diversity since fiscal year 2002. Id.; see also Walker Statement, supra note 
73 (discussing the “unique nature of immigration hearings,” wherein “[a]liens 
frequently do not speak English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a 
translator, and the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular testimony 
several times before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate answer from the 
alien”). 
 119 This is an especially important issue in light of the passage of the REAL ID 
Act of 2005, which added a provision to the asylum statute instructing IJs to “evaluate 
demeanor and consistency of statements to determine credibility.” Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief of 2005. Div. B (REAL ID Act of 2005), Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 
231, 303 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005)); see Katherine E. Melloy, 
Note, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect Women 
Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 640 (2007).  
 120 Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is not 
surprising that the position of overburdened immigration judges and overworked 
courts has become a matter of wide concern.”). 
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certain procedural rights, including the opportunity to present 
evidence on their behalf in removal proceedings.121 Additionally, 
a person seeking withholding of removal or relief under the 
Convention Against Torture is entitled to a fair hearing under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.122 In order to ensure the fairness of a removal 
proceeding, the arbiter must be neutral, meaning “one who has 
not pre-decided the case and who is not predisposed to 
disregard a witness’s testimony . . . .”123  
In addition to neutrality, immigration judges must 
maintain a basic level of competence in immigration law. This 
is especially true in light of the unique and difficult nature of 
immigration cases. Denise Slavin, former President of the 
National Association of Immigration Judges, noted, 
“Immigration law is very complex. So generally speaking, it’s 
very good to have someone coming into this area with [an] 
immigration background. It’s very difficult, for those who don’t, 
to catch up.”124 Also, immigration law changes often, and IJs 
must be able to apply the most current laws to each case.  
Unfortunately, in recent years the ability of 
immigration judges to render competent decisions, and to set 
aside their personal biases or prejudices against litigants, has 
come into question.125 Indeed, the very fact that Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales proposed a new set of codes of 
conduct indicates the government’s acknowledgment that a 
crisis exists in immigration court.126  
  
 121 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).  
 122 Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Al Khouri v. 
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause 
mandates that removal proceedings be fundamentally fair.”).  
 123 Tun, 485 F.3d at 1025; see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 
(1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested 
tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 
1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (Due Process violation existed because IJ refused to hear relevant 
testimony because of a prejudgment about the credibility of the witness). 
 124 Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at A1.  
 125 See sources cited supra note 11. 
 126 See infra Part IV.B. Alberto Gonzales resigned from office in August 2007, 
and his last day in office was September 17, 2007. Remarks of Attorney General 
Alberto R. Gonzales Announcing His Resignation, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/ag_speech_070827.html. Gonzales’s reform 
directives have not changed since his resignation. See Kent B. Alexander, The Future of 
the Justice Department, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007 (noting that the Department of 
Justice will continue its work even if there are changes among political appointees). On 
September 17, 2007, President George W. Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to 
replace Attorney General Gonzales. Michael Abramowitz & Dan Eggen, With Justice 
Pick, Bush Hopes to Avoid a Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007. The United States 
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D. Statistical Inconsistencies  
Considering the importance of the IJ’s decision-making 
process, it is especially alarming to note that scholars 
conducting recent statistical analyses have revealed evidence of 
inconsistent decisions made by immigration judges.127 Despite 
the fact that EOIR’s mission statement guarantees “uniform 
application of the nation’s immigration laws in all cases,” 
studies assessing the grant and deny rates of immigration 
judges in the same type of case show that “immigration courts 
are failing to meet this fundamental standard.”128  
A recent study on this issue by Professors Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, published in 
the Stanford Law Review (“Ramji-Nogales study”), identified 
disturbing inconsistencies in the adjudication of immigration 
law claims.129 Their analysis of immigration courts throughout 
the country revealed “remarkable variation in decision-
making” among different immigration officials, regions, judicial 
circuits, and years.130 For example, a Chinese asylum seeker in 
the Atlanta Immigration Court had a seven percent chance of 
winning asylum, compared to a seventy-six percent chance of 
winning asylum for a Chinese applicant in the Orlando 
Immigration Court.131 The study also examined grant rate 
disparities between judges from the same immigration court.132 
Incredibly, the study found that three out of four immigration 
courts housed judges with large grant rate disparities from 
other judges, meaning they were “out of step with the other 
judges in their courthouse.”133 Indeed, asylum applicants who 
  
Senate confirmed Judge Mukasey as Attorney General on November 8, 2007. Laurie 
Kellman, Mukasey Confirmed as Attorney General, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007. 
 127 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 372. This 2007 study parallels 
results discovered in a 2000 study published by the San Jose Mercury News. See 
Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Seekers Face Capricious Legal System; Some Judges Grant 
Asylum in Only 1 in 20 Cases, Others in 1 in Every 2; Former Government Immigration 
Lawyers Are Toughest Asylum Judges; Rulings Vary Widely, Even for Applicants with 
Similar Stories, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at A1. For data results, see 
TRAC, Judges Show Disparity in Denying Asylum, July 31, 2006, available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 (last visited July 22, 2007). For an excellent 
analysis of this data and its implications, see Alexander, supra note 8, at 21-25. 
 128 Alexander, supra note 8, at 21 (citing DOJ Mission Statement, supra note 
22). 
 129 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296. 
 130 Id. at 302.  
 131 Id. at 330-31.  
 132 Id. at 333.  
 133 Id. at 333-34.  
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appeared before the highest granting judge were nearly thirty 
times more likely to win their claims than applicants appearing 
before the lowest granting judge.134 These statistics are 
critically important, for they indicate that immigration law is 
not being applied in a uniform manner. As the study’s authors 
point out, the outcome of a refugee’s asylum claim depends 
most on the identity of the judge assigned to hear his case.135  
Disparities in the grant rates of immigration judges 
were successfully correlated to differences in biographical 
information of the judges.136 For example, the study found that 
female immigration judges granted asylum in 53.8% of asylum 
cases, while male judges granted relief in only 37.3% of asylum 
cases.137 In addition, immigration judges with prior work 
experience on the prosecutorial side of immigration proceedings 
were 24% less likely to grant asylum than those with no prior 
government experience.138 Notably, all judges with immigration 
law backgrounds appointed by the Bush administration since 
2001 had prosecutorial experience.139 
These statistics cannot be relied upon to show unethical 
behavior per se on the part of individual judges. However, 
scholars have suggested the mere fact that such inconsistencies 
existed within a court is some “evidence that the process is 
inaccurate and unfair.”140 Indeed, the Ramji-Nogales study’s 
authors concluded that the great deviation in grant rates for 
some immigration judges suggests that an adjudicator could be 
“imposing his or her own philosophical attitude (or personal 
level of skepticism about applicants’ testimony) to the cases 
under consideration.”141 The study’s authors believed their data 
raised “serious questions about whether the results of cases are 
excessively influenced by personal characteristics of the 
judges.”142 Similarly, Mr. Alexander cited statistics showing 
  
 134 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 330-32.  
 135 Id. at 296. 
 136 Id. at 296.  
 137 Id. at 342.  
 138 Id. at 345-46.  
 139 Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at A1. 
 140 Alexander, supra note 8, at 29; see also Jason D. Vendel, Note, General 
Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security Disability 
Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 773 (2005) (“[A] practical method of proof [to 
show judicial bias] is by examining multiple decisions—either statistically or in some 
other systematic manner.”). 
 141 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 378. 
 142 Id. at 304. Similar concerns existed regarding grant rates for asylum 
officers: “officers who adjudicate asylum applications in some of the eight regional 
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disparities among immigration judges’ decisions as “evidence  
of unfairness and inaccuracy” and an “indicator of the 
immigration court crisis.”143  
While all judges bring their personal experience to the 
bench, ethical standards exist to ensure that judges do not rely 
too heavily on their own preferences when making decisions. 
Evidence of disparities in decision-making signifies that judges’ 
personal preferences may unduly influence their decisions in 
court, since “inconsistency among judges suggests that bias and 
prejudice are influencing the outcomes.”144 For example, as the 
Ramji-Nogales study noted, “immigration lawyers have 
sometimes complained that after an immigrant judge is lied to 
several times by nationals of a particular country, the judge 
tends to suspect that all nationals of that country are liars.”145 
The notion that judges are basing their determinations on 
personal preferences rather than on the law epitomizes bias on 
the bench. Thus, in addition to calling for structural reform to 
respond to the crisis in immigration courts, the Ramji-Nogales 
study highlights the need for uniform ethical standards and 
strict enforcement of such standards for immigration judges.  
Unfortunately, with diminished monitoring of individ-
ual judges and courtrooms, it is more difficult to identify 
potentially problematic behavior.146 In reality, the burden of 
reprimanding immigration judges has fallen to the only 
persons thoroughly reviewing their conduct: federal appellate 
judges. 
E. Circuit Court Frustration  
The frustration of circuit court judges, who are faced 
with the onerous task of reviewing opinions from immigration 
judges that are usually summarily affirmed by the BIA, is 
rising. Since the 2003 reforms eliminating internal review 
procedures for immigration cases went into effect, appeals to 
the circuit courts have increased exponentially. For example, 
while the Ninth Circuit received 11,238 petitions for review in 
the thirty years between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002, it 
  
offices of the Department of Homeland Security’s asylum office appear to have grant 
rates that reflect personal outlooks rather than an office consensus.” Id. at 375.  
 143 Alexander, supra note 8, at 21. 
 144 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 25. 
 145 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 381-82.  
 146 EOIR does have procedures for complaints against IJs, but those 
procedures are inadequate. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.a.  
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received an incredible 18,263 petitions for review in just three 
years between April 1, 2002 and October 1, 2005.147  
The sheer number of petitions is not the only problem 
plaguing circuit courts. In an influential 2005 opinion voicing 
the concerns of appellate judges, Judge Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit cited an extensive pattern of judicial bias and 
inappropriate behavior on the part of immigration judges.148 
Circuit judges following Judge Posner’s lead are increasingly 
reprimanding immigration judges for problematic behavior.149 
In 2007, the Second Circuit took the highly unusual step of 
singling out an individual immigration judge for egregious 
behavior on the bench, and recommending the Justice 
  
 147 Palmer, supra note 18, at 14 n.3. Similarly, the Second Circuit received 
only 2360 petitions for review between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002, but received 
7723 petitions for review between April 1, 2002, and October 1, 2005. Id. at 14 n.2. 
 148 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner’s 
list of circuit cases rebuking the conduct of IJs and the BIA includes Dawoud v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The IJ’s opinion is riddled with 
inappropriate and extraneous comments . . . .”); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“This very significant mistake suggests that the Board was not aware 
of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case . . . .”); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 
F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The procedure that the IJ employed in this case is an 
affront to [petitioner’s] right to be heard.”); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 738 
(7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding the IJ’s factual conclusion to be “totally 
unsupported by the record”); Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(finding the IJ’s unexplained conclusion to be “hard to take seriously”). Noting that 
“[o]ther circuits have been as critical,” Judge Posner cited cases from different circuits, 
including Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The 
tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to 
a court television show than a federal court proceeding.”); Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the IJ’s finding to be “grounded solely on 
speculation and conjecture”); Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct 
toward petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding”); 
Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the IJ’s conclusion, not 
[the petitioner’s] testimony, that ‘strains credulity.’”). Id. 
 149 See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
the IJ’s “intemperate” manner and sarcasm with petitioner “raised substantial 
questions as to his bias and hostility toward” the asylum applicant); N’Diom v. 
Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., concurring) (noting the 
“significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic, and effort 
from . . . immigration courts is reaching the federal circuits”); Sholla v. Gonzales, 492 
F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2007) (IJ denied asylum even though “the record compels any 
reasonable factfinder to conclude that [the applicant] suffered past persecution on a 
protected ground”); Mece v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 562, 572 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The Board’s 
failure to find clear error in the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination 
leaves us, we are frank to say, more than a little puzzled.”); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 
530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The immigration judge’s opinion cannot be regarded as 
reasoned . . . .”); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1166-68 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally Pasha v. Gonzales, 
433 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005).  
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Department review each of this judge’s decisions.150 The judge 
was later removed from the bench.151 
Immigration lawyers practicing in immigration court 
believe that biased and incompetent behavior is widespread on 
the immigration bench.152 Anecdotal evidence of this type of 
unethical conduct is plentiful in immigration cases recently 
reviewed by the circuit courts. Two 2007 cases particularly 
highlight the problems of bias and incompetence in 
immigration court.  
1. The Biased Immigration Judge: Tun v. Gonzales 
To understand the impact of bias on the bench, we 
return to the story of Naing Tun, a Burmese citizen seeking 
asylum in the United States. In May 2007, in response to Tun’s 
appeal of the IJ’s and BIA’s denials of his asylum claim, the 
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of bias in immigration 
courtrooms.153 As a member of a minority group in Burma, Tun 
filed an application for asylum claiming torture, past 
persecution, and a fear of future persecution. Tun alleged he 
had been arrested, interrogated, and beaten due to his political 
activities.154 He further claimed he had been incarcerated for 
three years and forced to do hard labor.155 
To prove his claims, Tun submitted two expert opinions. 
The first was a report by a recognized expert on conditions in 
Burma. Despite the expert’s strong qualifications in the field 
and his report speaking to a “critical, contested issue in the 
case,”156 the IJ concluded that the expert’s document would “not 
be given any weight” because the government was unable to 
cross-examine him.157 The second expert opinion, also excluded 
by the immigration judge, was a medical report submitted as 
evidence of the residual trauma Tun endured due to torture at 
the hands of Burmese authorities.158 Notwithstanding the 
  
 150 Ray Rivera, Court Urges Review of New York Judge’s Immigration Cases 
That Are on Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at 1. 
 151 Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judge Is Reassigned to a Desk Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at B1. 
 152 Interviews with anonymous immigration law practitioners, S.F., Calif., 
July and August 2007 (notes on file with author). 
 153 Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 154 Id. at 1018. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 1017-18. 
 157 Id. at 1019. 
 158 Id. at 1019-20. 
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physician’s extensive experience treating victims of trauma and 
volunteer medical work in numerous war-torn countries, the IJ 
concluded the physician was not a qualified expert, in part 
because she had not personally been to Burma.159 
These actions on the part of the IJ demonstrate an 
unwillingness to consider properly proffered evidence 
submitted by an asylum applicant.160 However, the bias of this 
immigration judge against Tun became even more apparent as 
his hearing continued. The IJ and the attorneys involved in the 
case questioned Tun through a Burmese interpreter.161 Tun 
provided detailed testimony of his arrest, beatings, and other 
forms of mistreatment caused by the Burmese government for 
his political activities. However, there were “at least a dozen 
instances” where Tun indicated that he did not understand the 
translator, and “at least a dozen other instances” where Tun’s 
responses, as provided to the court by the translator, were 
“confusing or not directly responsive to the questions originally 
asked in English.”162 A native Burmese speaker present in the 
courtroom interrupted the proceedings to inform the 
immigration judge that “the official translator was not correctly 
translating the questions and answers.”163 After the hearing, 
the IJ declined Tun’s request to reopen the record or hold a 
new hearing based on translation errors.164 Relying on Tun’s 
allegedly “inconsistent” testimony, the IJ concluded that Tun 
lacked credibility.165 Based on her adverse credibility 
determinations, the immigration judge denied Tun’s request for 
asylum. 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Tun’s 
appeal, holding that the record provided examples to support 
the IJ’s finding of inconsistencies.166 Upon review, the Eight 
Circuit disagreed with the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions. In doing 
so, the court considered the IJ’s exclusions of the expert’s 
  
 159 Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020. 
 160 Immigration judges are required to advise a litigant that “he or she will 
have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or 
her,” and “to present evidence in his or her own behalf.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2007). 
 161 Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020. 
 162 Id. at 1022. The Eighth Circuit quoted the improper translation in detail in 
the opinion. Id. at 1022 n.2.  
 163 Id. at 1017.  
 164 Id. at 1024. 
 165 Id. at 1030-31. 
 166 Id. at 1025. 
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reports and evaluated the alleged inconsistencies in Tun’s 
testimony. 
Regarding the testimony of the Burmese expert, the 
court held the expert was undoubtedly qualified to report on 
country conditions in Burma. Moreover, the court noted that 
the presence of an author of a report and his availability  
for cross-examination are not “absolute requirements” for 
submission of the report in immigration proceedings.167 The 
court found the IJ’s decision to “exclude the report of a facially 
unobjectionable expert without any explanation as to why 
cross-examination was needed” was “unfair and unsupport-
able.”168  
The court similarly found that the second expert, a 
physician, was clearly qualified to offer “critical corroborating 
testimony.”169 As such, the court determined that the exclusion 
of Dr. Frye’s report affected the outcome of the proceedings, 
since the IJ “completely ignored the most valuable 
corroborating evidence of [Tun’s] torture.”170 The court noted 
that the IJ’s desire to conclude the hearing in time to allow the 
court translator to “make a six o’clock flight” later that day 
seemed to have substantial weight in the IJ’s decision to 
exclude Dr. Frye’s testimony.171 Significant from an ethical 
perspective, the court recognized that the IJ’s actions 
suggested she “may not have acted as a neutral arbiter.”172  
Lastly, the court was “troubled by the lack of 
consideration given by the IJ and the Board” to the issue of 
translation error, especially since all “indicia of erroneous 
translation were present” in Tun’s case.173 The errors performed 
by the IJ went beyond simply ignoring evidence of erroneous 
translation. The IJ also improperly relied on the resulting 
erroneous portions of the transcript to find that Tun lacked 
credibility, and focused on “minutia in the effort to find 
inconsistencies” in Tun’s testimony.174 Together, the court found 
  
 167 Id. at 1028. 
 168 Id. at 1028-29. 
 169 Id. at 1027. 
 170 Id. at 1028. 
 171 Id. at 1026. 
 172 Id. at 1027. 
 173 Id. at 1029-30. 
 174 Id. at 1030. The court noted that “we can have no confidence that the 
answers relayed by the interpreter to the IJ and the attorneys accurately reflected 
what [Tun] answered.” Id. 
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these errors added to the “overall prejudice” against Tun.175 
Accordingly, the court remanded the case with specific 
instructions to the IJ to ensure adequate translation and to 
consider specific evidence submitted by Tun.176 
Tun v. Gonzales represents the substantive effects of a 
biased judge in immigration proceedings. As the court noted, 
the immigration judge’s combined errors were “sufficiently 
pervasive that we must conclude they may have had an effect 
on the outcome” of the case.177 Unlike other IJs reprimanded by 
circuit courts, the immigration judge in Tun did not vocalize 
her bias by yelling or speaking in an improper manner.178 
Rather, the IJ’s bias against Tun took a more subtle form, 
exemplified by her refusal to consider the adequacy of the 
translation services provided to Tun during his hearing.  
The IJ was certainly alerted to the translation problem. 
But even with knowledge of potentially erroneous translation 
occurring in her courtroom, the IJ took no action to ensure the 
reliability of Tun’s translated testimony. Without the presence 
of a native Burmese speaker in the courtroom, Tun may never 
have known his words were not being properly conveyed to the 
judge. Although Tun successfully convinced the Eighth Circuit 
that the translation problem affected the outcome of his case, a 
more disturbing question remains: why would an IJ fail to 
ensure an applicant’s testimony is being properly translated?  
Surely immigration judges are aware that federal law 
requires proper translation in immigration hearings.179 Thus, 
the problem was not the result of the IJ’s lack of knowledge. 
Rather, the IJ’s refusal to ensure adequate translation services 
to Tun suggests the presence of bias against an asylum 
applicant. Essentially, the IJ’s actions indicated to Tun that his 
own words were irrelevant; if she was not going to consider his 
testimony anyway, why bother to translate his words 
accurately? In this way, the IJ’s bias impacted her decision-
  
 175 Tun, 485 F.3d at 1030. 
 176 Id. at 1031. 
 177 Id.  
 178 Immigration judges have been reprimanded for yelling at litigants, using 
sarcastic language, and otherwise displaying blatantly inappropriate behavior on the 
bench. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007); Wang v. Attorney 
Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 179 Federal law requires that interpreters in a hearing before an IJ be “sworn 
to interpret and translate accurately.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 (2007). However, interpreters 
in immigration courtrooms are “of mixed ability.” Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, 
at 383. 
2008] CRISIS ON THE IMMIGRATION BENCH 497 
making process and had a significant negative effect on Tun’s 
case. Despite the difficulties inherent in identifying this type of 
unethical conduct, this case represents the importance of 
eliminating bias from the immigration bench.  
2.  The Incompetent Immigration Judge: Tadesse v. 
Gonzales  
In addition to biased conduct, judicial incompetence in 
immigration courts is raising increased concerns in the circuit 
courts. In July 2007, the Seventh Circuit reprimanded the 
incompetent conduct of an immigration judge in Tadesse v. 
Gonzales.180 Ejigu Tadesse was an Ethiopian citizen of half 
Eritrean descent.181 After a cease-fire was declared ending the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tadesse tried to travel to 
Ethiopia to learn what had happened to her immediate 
family.182 She was detained at the airport by Ethiopian 
policemen, who accused her of being an Eritrean spy due to her 
ethnic heritage. Tadesse claimed the policemen severely beat 
her and that two of the officers raped her. They then ordered 
her to leave the country.183 Tadesse sought medical treatment 
and stayed with a family friend for two months before leaving 
Ethiopia. She eventually arrived in the United States and 
sought asylum. 
The immigration judge denied Tadesse’s application for 
asylum, holding that she included fraudulent documents in her 
application for asylum and finding Tadesse’s testimony 
“implausible and inconsistent.”184 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision and Tadesse sought relief in the circuit courts.  
The IJ first concluded that Tadesse submitted 
fraudulent documents as part of her asylum application. 
During the merits hearing, the government submitted a report 
concluding that Tadesse’s Ethiopian deportation order was 
fraudulent.185 Tadesse objected on the grounds that she had not 
been given an opportunity to study the report in advance of the 
hearing.186 The IJ did not give Tadesse an opportunity to review 
  
 180 492 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 181 Id. at 906.  
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 907. Ms. Tadesse was represented before the IJ by attorney Nancy 
Vizer, who provided additional insight into this case. 
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the report, but promised to allow Tadesse to present her own 
expert in rebuttal.187 
At the next hearing, Tadesse offered an affidavit and 
expert testimony of an “eminent scholar” of Ethiopian politics 
and culture who had written extensively about Ethiopia.188 
However, the IJ refused to accept the expert’s affidavit or 
testimony because he was not “an expert as to the issuance of 
documents.”189 In the first of a series of rebukes to the 
immigration judge, the appellate court held the IJ’s rejection of 
this evidence was “arbitrary” and “prejudicial,” because the 
expert testimony was “directly on point [to the authenticity of 
the deportation order] and went to the very heart of Tadesse’s 
claim.”190  
The IJ also discounted the evidence offered by Tadesse 
in the affidavit of her torture counselor, reasoning that 
“although [the counselor] is a ‘therapist’ she is not a 
psychologist or psychiatrist.”191 However, the counselor’s 
affidavit noted that she held a master’s degree in psychology 
and expected to receive her Ph.D. in clinical psychology nine 
months prior to the IJ’s date of decision. Thus, the “IJ’s 
comment was therefore incorrect as well as inappropriate.”192 
Regarding Tadesse’s post-torture symptoms, the IJ’s opinion 
came to a conclusion that was “completely at odds with [the 
counselor’s] affidavit.”193 Such discrepancies led the Seventh 
Circuit to conclude that the IJ had not properly reviewed the 
evidence, for the “IJ could not have carefully reviewed [the 
counselor’s] findings and reached this conclusion.”194 The 
appellate court’s frustration with the IJ’s inadequate judicial 
performance was quite evident: the court complained that 
“[t]his portion of the opinion, like so much else, is not 
supported by cogent reasons and cannot stand.”195  
Although the IJ further concluded that portions of 
Tadesse’s testimony related to her return to Ethiopia and her 
choice to seek asylum were “implausible,” the court repri-
manded the IJ for such conclusions, which were “unsupported 
  
 187 Tadesse, 492 F.3d at 907. 
 188 Id. at 908. 
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at 909. 
 191 Id. at 911. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
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by substantial evidence.”196 The court ultimately determined 
the IJ’s opinion was “riddled with systematic and obvious 
errors.”197 As a result of the IJ’s erroneous opinion, the court 
found that Tadesse did not receive a fair hearing in 
immigration court and therefore granted Tadesse’s petition for 
review and remanded her case.198 
The IJ hearing Tadesse’s claim acted incompetently in 
several ways. First, her failure to allow Tadesse to offer expert 
evidence in rebuttal was legally improper, since “an IJ may  
not bar whole chunks of material evidence favorable to 
[Tadesse].”199 At a minimum judicial competence requires “legal 
knowledge.”200 By failing to properly follow the law permitting 
an applicant to present evidence on her own behalf, the IJ 
displayed a lack of “legal knowledge” necessary to properly 
decide this case.  
Second, the IJ’s obvious failure to carefully review an 
affidavit submitted by Tadesse is disturbing. Although judicial 
competence requires “thoroughness” and “preparation,”201 the IJ 
deciding Tadesse’s case did not adjudicate the case in a 
thorough manner. Moreover, if immigration judges are not 
reviewing evidence put forth by applicants, the competency and 
integrity of the entire hearing is undermined.  
Not surprisingly, given that the IJ did not properly 
consider Tadesse’s written evidence, the IJ also inexplicably 
refused to believe portions of Tadesse’s testimony. Certainly it 
is within the discretion of an immigration judge to determine 
whether an applicant is lying, but the circuit court found that 
this IJ’s credibility determinations were unsupported by 
substantial evidence—that is, she had no logical reason to 
believe Tadesse was lying.  
These issues point to a larger and inescapable ethical 
conclusion: the immigration judge was either legally 
incompetent, or was actively biased against Tadesse. Either of 
these possibilities is contrary to the American concept of 
justice. Even in the face of limited resources and time 
constraints, a “neutral” arbiter should follow the rules of 
  
 196 Id. at 910. 
 197 Id. at 912. 
 198  Id.  
 199 Id. at 909; see also Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir. 
2006) (finding IJ’s exclusion of asylum applicant’s corroboration witnesses to be 
prejudicial error); Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 200 ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1]. 
 201 Id.  
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evidence and should be reasonably prepared for a hearing. 
Without the assurance of unbiased and competent behavior on 
the bench, the immigration system cannot reasonably promise 
litigants they will receive a fair hearing. In this way, active 
bias or legal incompetence on the part of immigration judges 
skews the system itself; if an immigrant’s claim is ultimately 
decided through an unfair proceeding, the reliability of the 
entire adjudicatory process is threatened. In light of these far-
reaching consequences, evidence showing judicial bias and 
incompetence raises the next question: what are the causes of 
unethical conduct on the immigration bench? 
IV.  CAUSES AND PENDING SOLUTIONS 
A. Causes of Unethical Conduct 
Several potential causes of unethical behavior on the 
part of immigration judges emerge through analysis of recent 
cases. One reason, discussed in Part III.C, supra, is the difficult 
and unique nature of immigration cases. Another contributing 
factor—analyzed often by scholars and practitioners—is the 
lack of time and resources available to immigration judges.202  
Immigration judges are certainly overworked; in 2006, 
the nation’s 215 immigration judges completed a total of 
365,851 cases.203 Each judge must therefore adjudicate 1,700 
cases a year, or nearly seven cases each business day, to stay 
current with her docket.204 Although Second Circuit Chief 
Judge Walker urged Congress to double the existing number of 
immigration judges, Congress has yet to do so.205  
Without the ability to take time to consider each case, 
immigration judges are bound to make mistakes—often serious 
mistakes with critical implications for the immigrants 
appearing before them.206 A judge without the time or resources 
  
 202 Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20; Melloy, supra note 119, at 666-67; 
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 383.  
 203 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at B2; Alexander, supra note 8, at 19.  
 204 The former President of the National Association of Immigration Judges, 
Denise Slavin, reported in 2005 that she had 1,000 cases on her docket at one time. 
Liptak, supra note 8; see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20. Immigration judges in 
busy districts must manage disproportionately larger caseloads; “while the average 
immigration judge hears four cases a day, immigration judges on the Texas border hear 
at least ten.” Melloy, supra note 119, at 666. 
 205 Walker Statement, supra note 73.  
 206 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that IJs “simply do not have 
enough time to do their jobs well”).  
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to adequately review changes in the law, or to properly 
consider fact-intensive cases, may slip into a pattern of errors. 
In this way, an overworked judge can quickly become an 
incompetent judge.207 For example, Tadesse’s IJ may have 
failed to adequately read Tadesse’s affidavit due to time 
constraints; Tadesse’s case was likely only one of many merits 
hearings heard by the IJ that day. Also, an immigration judge 
feeling pressure to complete a large caseload may lose the 
ability to recognize where personal bias enters the decision-
making process.  
However, even if the reasons for bias or incompetence 
on the part of immigration judges can be understood in the 
context of difficult cases and understaffed courts, such behavior 
violates the norms of judicial ethics. Judicial neutrality and 
competence must be prioritized over expedient resolution of 
cases. As the Seventh Circuit noted in 2004, litigants seeking 
to remain in the United States “should not bear the entire 
burden of adjudicative inadequacy at the administrative 
level.”208 Fortunately, the government now recognizes the 
importance of ensuring ethical conduct in immigration courts. 
B. The Response of Attorney General Gonzales: The EOIR 
Codes of Conduct 
The growing cry for reform—from immigration 
practitioners, circuit court judges, and immigration judges 
themselves209—finally reached the ears of Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales. In January 2006, Gonzales announced that 
he received reports of conduct on the part of immigration 
judges which “can aptly be described as intemperate or even 
  
 207 Immigration judges are under extreme pressure to complete cases 
expeditiously, to the point where some Assistant Chief Immigration Judges actually 
visit IJs in person to encourage them to move cases more quickly. Marks Interview, 
supra note 66. In this type of environment, judges are “less inclined to sit and listen to 
a case, or to give it the time it needs.” Former IJ Interview, supra note 28. 
 208 Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have 
never heard it argued that busy judges should be excused from having to deliver 
reasoned judgments because they are too busy to think.”); see also Iao v. Gonzales, 400 
F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are not authorized to affirm unreasoned decisions 
even when we understand why they are unreasoned.”). 
 209 See generally Liptak, supra note 8.  
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abusive.”210 Following a “comprehensive review,” Gonzales 
proposed a set of reforms in August 2006.211 
These “key reforms” included performance evaluations 
for immigration judges, an immigration law exam, sanctioning 
powers allowing immigration judges to sanction litigants and 
counsel for “false statements, frivolous behavior, and other 
gross misconduct,”212 increased resources, and technological 
improvements.213 On the issue of judicial ethics, Gonzales 
promised to draft a new code of conduct for immigration judges 
and BIA members, impose “mechanisms to detect poor conduct 
and quality by immigration judges and Board members,” and 
improve complaint procedures for inappropriate conduct by 
adjudicators.214  
Gonzales’s reform measures were initially hailed as a 
large step in the right direction.215 However, it soon became 
apparent that implementation of these reforms would not be an 
expedited or simple task. More than a year after Attorney 
General promised reforms, immigration judges had not seen 
any “changes on the ground.”216  
It took nearly a year after the reforms were announced 
for EOIR to release the promised “Codes of Conduct of the 
Immigration Judges and Board Members” (“EOIR Codes”).217 
  
 210 Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Immigration 
Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-
memo-ijs.pdf.  
 211 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales 
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 
2006) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/ 
August/06_ag_520.html.  
 212  Allowing IJs to sanction litigants could enable these judges to control 
potentially unethical behavior on the part of immigration lawyers in their courtrooms. 
However, given the persistence of unethical behavior on the part of IJs themselves, this 
particular reform idea will not remedy the ethical crisis on the bench. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Melloy, supra note 119, at 667 n.228. 
 216 Pamela A. Maclean, Mixed Signals from the DOJ Immigration Bench 
Reforms: Implemented, or Not?, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1; see also NAIJ Letter, 
supra note 113. (“[As of February 2008], there has been no implementation [of] what 
we consider to be the two key measures [in Attorney General Gonzales’s reform 
proposal] to improve the Immigration Court system. Indeed, we have lost ground.” 
(endnote omitted)). 
 217 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges and Board 
Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,510 (proposed June 28, 2007) [hereinafter EOIR CODES]. The 
Codes were released for public comment from June 28, 2007 to July 30, 2007; final 
publication is pending. There is a separate set of codes for IJs and for members of the 
BIA, but their provisions are substantially similar and the references herein generally 
apply to both. 
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The EOIR Codes, proposed in June 2007, are intended to 
supplement the personnel disciplinary rules, ethics rules, and 
management policies of EOIR and the DOJ, and are designed 
to “preserve the integrity and professionalism of the 
immigration court system” and the BIA.218 EOIR has not 
announced when the Codes are expected to be published in 
final form and the process of editing the Codes is “internal” to 
the DOJ. 219 
The proposed EOIR Codes are similar to those already 
in place for other judges. For example, like the recently revised 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the EOIR Codes require 
IJs/BIA members to avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety.220 The Codes require an IJ/BIA member to comply 
with the codes of professional responsibility where the IJ/BIA 
member is a member of the bar, as well as the state in which 
the IJ/BIA member performs his/her duties.221 This rule could 
provide a significant basis for disciplinary procedures against 
IJs or BIA members who fail to comply with ethical guidelines 
as attorneys.  
The EOIR Codes demonstrate a renewed emphasis on 
professionalism for IJs and BIA members, perhaps acknowl-
edging the effects of inappropriate judicial conduct on the 
perceived integrity of the immigration structure. As the 
Commentary to the EOIR Codes recognizes, “an immigration 
judge who manifests bias or engages in unprofessional conduct 
in any manner during a proceeding may impair the fairness of 
the proceeding and may bring into question the impartiality of 
the immigration court system.”222 The EOIR Codes require 
immigration judges and BIA members to “act in a professional 
manner toward the parties and their representatives before the 
court, and toward others with whom the immigration judge 
deals in an official capacity.”223 Like the ABA Code of Judicial 
Conduct, the EOIR Codes also require that IJs/BIA members 
act “impartially” and avoid any actions that “in the judgment of 
a reasonable person, would create the appearance that he or 
  
 218 Id. pmbl. (capitalization removed). 
 219 Telephone Interview with official from EOIR Office of Legislative and 
Public Affairs (Aug. 18, 2007).  
 220 EOIR CODES, supra note 217, pmbl.; ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, 
Rule 1.2. 
 221 EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.  
 222 Id. Commentary.  
 223 Id. Canon X. 
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she is violating the law or applicable ethical standards.”224 IJs 
and BIA members must therefore “refrain from any conduct, 
including but not limited to financial and business dealings, 
that tends to reflect adversely on impartiality, demeans the 
judicial office, interferes with the proper performance of 
judicial duties, or exploits the immigration judge’s official 
position.”225  
Furthermore, the EOIR Codes address the issue of bias 
and incompetence in the courtroom. Like other types of judges, 
immigration judges and BIA members must adhere to the law 
and “maintain professional competence in it.”226 In addition to 
this basic requirement of competence, EOIR now requires that 
an immigration judge “shall be patient, dignified, and 
courteous to litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with 
whom the judge deals in his or her official capacity.”227 
Although this point should be a matter of simple professional 
courtesy, the behavior of the IJs hearing Tun’s and Tadesse’s 
cases sadly demonstrates the necessity for this rule. 
On the issue of bias, both immigration judges and BIA 
members are informed they “shall not, in the performance of 
official duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or 
prejudice.”228 This critical provision is clearly a response to 
concerns of biased and prejudiced behavior by IJs and BIA 
members against litigants. The burden lies on the judges 
themselves, who must be “alert to avoid behavior, to include 
inappropriate demeanor, that may be perceived as 
prejudicial.”229 While these statements should be heralded as 
long overdue and promising developments for ethical 
standards, they also highlight the limitations of such Codes of 
Conduct.  
The EOIR Codes fail to adequately address the unique 
nature of immigration court. The Codes do not acknowledge the 
language challenges, credibility issues, and fact-intensive 
inquiries conducted by immigration judges. One immigration 
judge, speaking off the record, noted that the Codes do not 
provide any real guidance, since they do not contain anything 
  
 224 Id. Canons VI, VII. 
 225 Id. Canon XI. 
 226 Id. Canon V.  
 227 Id. Canon IX. 
 228 Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the limitations of this provision, 
see infra Part IV.C.1.  
 229 Id. Commentary (emphasis added). 
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“different from what all of us [should] try to do in the first 
place.”230  
Specific shortcomings undermine the ability of the EOIR 
Codes to effectively remedy unethical conduct on the part of 
immigration judges. For example, the Codes lack both 
specificity and effective enforcement mechanisms. At this time, 
neither existing ethical guidelines nor EOIR’s complaint 
procedures are adequately protecting litigants from unethical 
judicial behavior. Without a more effective method of 
monitoring and enforcement, the newly created EOIR Codes of 
Conduct are merely words on paper.  
C. Weakness in the EOIR Codes of Conduct 
1. Lack of Specificity 
Unlike the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the 
current proposed EOIR Codes fail to define key terms 
necessary for proper implementation. The most alarming 
example is the EOIR Codes’ failure to define the terms “bias 
and prejudice.” The drafters did provide an explanatory test to 
determine whether an “appearance of impropriety” exists, but 
offered no guidance on what types of behavior may “manifest 
bias” or “impair [the proceeding’s] fairness.”231  
In contrast, recognizing that “[a]n independent, fair and 
impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice,”232 
Rule 2.3 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
specifically addresses “Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.” 
Contrary to the EOIR Codes, the Model Code specifically 
outlines prohibited behavior.233 For example, Rule 2.3(B), the 
black letter portion of the Code, provides a judge shall not 
manifest bias or prejudice, by words or conduct, on the basis of 
  
 230 Telephone Interview with anonymous IJ (July 31, 2007). 
 231 According to the EOIR Codes, the test to determine the appearance of 
impropriety is “whether the conduct would create in the mind of a reasonable person 
with knowledge of the relevant facts the belief that the immigration judge’s ability to 
carry out adjudicatory responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is 
impaired.” EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The AILA agrees that the EOIR 
Codes lack specific guidance. See Comments to Proposed Codes of Conduct for 
Immigration Judges and BIA Members, July 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=23005. The National Association of 
Immigration Judges also took the position that the Codes lack relevant guidance for 
IJs and drafted a more thorough “Code of Conduct” for EOIR’s consideration, closely 
based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Marks Interview, supra note 66. 
 232 ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, pmbl. 
 233 See, e.g., id. Rule 2.3.  
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factors “including but not limited to” race, sex, gender, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, 
marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.234 
Likewise, the Codes of Conduct for United States Judges 
impose the responsibility to “avoid comment or behavior that 
can reasonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or 
bias…on the basis of personal characteristics like race, sex, 
religion, or national origin.”235  
Moreover, the Comment to ABA Model Rule 2.3 is even 
more helpful. Comment 2 to Rule 2.3 presents “examples of 
manifestation of bias or prejudice,” including but not limited to 
“epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; 
attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, 
intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections 
between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and 
irrelevant references to personal characteristics.”236 In addition, 
the Comment notes that “[e]ven facial expressions and body 
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, 
jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias and 
prejudice.”237 Accordingly, the Model Code requires that a judge 
“must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as 
prejudiced or biased.”238 
The specific examples were added to the 2007 Model 
Code after witnesses urged the ABA Commission to provide 
illustrations of bias, and “to better inform judges of what bias 
entails and what some of the most common bias-related 
problems are.”239 By enumerating factors and offering examples 
of biased behavior, these codes of conduct provide greater 
guidance for judges to “check themselves” for hidden bias or 
prejudice in the courtroom.  
Based on the recently reported behavior of immigration 
judges, the ABA “examples of manifestation of bias and 
prejudice” are common occurrences in immigration courts.240 
Yet the EOIR Codes of Conduct fail to list even one factor or 
example of manifested bias or prejudice. This simple omission 
  
 234 ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.3(B). 
 235 Id. Rule 2.3, cmt. 2. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id.  
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges would benefit from 
similar enumerated examples.  
 240 See supra note 149. 
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has broad ramifications, for every individual has a different 
view of what the term “bias” can entail. 
Similarly, the EOIR Codes order immigration judges 
and BIA members to “maintain professional competence” in the 
law.241 However, the EOIR Codes fail to specifically define the 
term “competence” for immigration judges. As noted above, the 
ABA defines judicial competence as requiring “the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial 
office.”242 As an aspirational set of rules, the ABA definition 
could easily be applied to immigration judges and BIA 
members.  
But competence might have a broader meaning for 
immigration judges and BIA members, who must stay abreast 
of the constantly changing world of immigration law and face 
unique challenges in their daily work. Certainly, knowledge 
and skills in immigration law are absolutely necessary for 
immigration judges; in response to reports of judicial 
incompetence, the Attorney General is implementing 
“immigration law exams” for judges appointed after December 
2006.243 But the Attorney General also will require 
“performance evaluations” of immigration judges, which will 
include an assessment as to whether new appointees “possess 
the appropriate judicial temperament . . . for the job.”244 This 
assessment suggests that “temperament” is a significant 
component of competence in the Attorney General’s view.  
Given these developments, EOIR should utilize its 
proposed Codes of Conduct as an opportunity to expand upon 
the ABA definition of judicial competence. For example, judicial 
competence should include the concept of “proper judicial 
temperament,” in addition to knowledge of applicable law and 
preparation for individual cases. The term “competence” could 
also be clarified by requiring all immigration judges to pass a 
substantive immigration law exam annually as part of formal 
training; such a requirement would send a clear signal to 
immigration judges that judicial competence requires more 
than merely expediting completion of cases. In short, the terms 
  
 241 EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon V. 
 242 ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1]. 
 243 DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. Because the exams will apply only to 
judges appointed after December 31, 2006, existing judges are apparently exempt from 
the immigration law exam. Id. 
 244 Id.  
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“bias” and “competence” must be more clearly defined, 
particularly in an ethical scheme asking judges to regulate 
their own behavior. 
2. Lack of Enforcement Mechanism 
The efficacy of the EOIR Codes of Conduct is further 
limited by its reliance on self-regulation of ethical conduct. 
How can an immigration judge or BIA member, who may have 
years of ingrained frustrations resulting in biases against 
litigants in immigration courts, “be alert to avoid” her own 
behavior or accustomed demeanor?245 In light of the egregious 
behaviors outlined in the cases and statistics above, an ethical 
scheme relying on judges to identify their own incompetence, or 
minimize their own biases, is problematic.246 Thus, another 
limitation of the EOIR Codes, and arguably the most 
damaging, is the lack of an effective external enforcement 
mechanism.  
Theoretically, the EOIR Codes may be enforced by the 
current procedure for complaints of misconduct, for the Codes 
provide that any disciplinary action must come from within the 
Department of Justice. The Commentary states, “This Code 
does not create any rights or interests for any party outside of 
the Department of Justice, nor may violations furnish the basis 
for civil liability, injunctive relief or criminal prosecution.”247 
This provision ostensibly places responsibility on the DOJ, 
rather than third parties, to monitor and enforce the Codes.248 
However, such a structure will likely be ineffective, for the 
DOJ’s current disciplinary structure for IJs suffers from 
several weaknesses.  
  
 245 EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. 
 246 See generally Randy Lee, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal 
Profession: Have We Locked the Fox in the Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 69 
(2002).  
 247 EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. 
 248 The EOIR Codes Commentary indicates that “[v]iolations of these canons 
may serve as the basis for disciplinary action, but may not be used in any other 
proceeding, and may not be used to challenge the rulings of an Immigration Judge.” 
EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The EOIR Codes should instead provide an 
“extra layer” of oversight to prohibit conduct that might not affect the substantive 
outcome of the proceeding, but is nonetheless inappropriate and detrimental to the 
integrity of the immigration system. 
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a. Current Disciplinary Procedures Are 
Inadequate to Ensure Compliance  
with Ethical Codes  
The current disciplinary structure for immigration 
judges does not adequately enforce ethical conduct on the 
bench. On its face, the disciplinary process is limited by the 
lack of external review. Complaints of misconduct are directed 
to the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge who holds 
supervisory authority over the judge in question.249 Unless 
referral to the Office of Professional Responsibility is deemed 
warranted,250 the complaint stays with the ACIJ; while the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge and the EOIR Director 
are made aware of the complaint, it is the ACIJ who is 
responsible for handling the complaint.  
If the supervisor determines the complaint lacks merit, 
the process ends there. Unfortunately, as members of the 
immigration court system, ACIJs suffer from the same working 
pressures as IJs. Moreover, if the ACIJ has a strong working 
relationship or is friendly with the IJ, the ACIJ may be less 
likely to take disciplinary action. The individual filing a 
complaint has no method of appeal, meaning the determination 
of the ACIJ can effectively end the complaint process. The 
OCIJ does not disclose whether action, if any, is taken against 
an employee in response to a complaint.251  
EOIR’s complaint process has been criticized as murky 
and bureaucratic by immigration experts outside of EOIR. 
Immigration practitioners complain about the “uncertainty as 
to what actions OCIJ takes on such complaints” as well as 
“what types of complaints are likely to be of concern to OCIJ.”252 
As a result, some practitioners believe that it does “no good to 
complain because nothing ever happens.”253 The issues of 
underreporting and the determination of whether immigrants 
and practitioners are discouraged from filing complaints 
against IJs are worthy of further study.  
Concern also exists that the disciplinary procedure for 
immigration judges is used for political purposes, rather than 
  
 249  See supra Part II.D. 
 250 See discussion supra note 85. 
 251 EOIR/AILA Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, March 7, 2002, Question 
4, Response, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila0203.htm. 
 252 Id. Question 4.  
 253 Id.  
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used to remedy actual misconduct. EOIR holds the power to 
“reassign” immigration judges to different job titles or job 
duties as a “matter of management discretion.”254 Reassignment 
in such cases is not deemed “disciplinary in nature if there is 
no loss of pay or grade”—even if a judge is removed from the 
bench.255 Similarly, the Attorney General may also reassign or 
remove immigration judges at any time.256 Given recent 
examples of political removals, such as Ashcroft’s removal of 
BIA members who were more likely to favor immigrants, 
immigration judges are left with an “emerging fear that ruling 
against the government in a deportation case can be hazardous 
to one’s job.”257 
The Attorney General recently attempted to implement 
another layer of ethical review with the creation of a new 
position: Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for Conduct and 
Professionalism.258 As noted, the person holding this position is 
essentially an ACIJ serving an advisory role in issues of 
ethics.259 The implementation of a position focused on conduct 
and professionalism could represent a promising step in the 
area of ethical monitoring, as it indicates EOIR’s renewed 
dedication to ensuring ethical behavior on the part of 
immigration judges. However, because the ACIJ for Conduct 
and Professionalism appears to be merely an advisory 
position,260 ethical monitoring in EOIR would benefit from the 
implementation of a multi-member panel (in the form of the 
  
 254 Legomsky, supra note 52, at 373. 
 255 Id. at 373-74. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. For this reason, many IJs, scholars, and advocates are calling for the 
removal of the immigration courts from the Department of Justice. See Legomsky, 
supra note 52, at 373 n.14 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges unpublished 
position paper calling for an independent immigration court), 404 (“In view of the 
events of 2002 and 2003, the adjudicators can never again feel confident that they can 
safely rule against the Department . . . .”); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, 
at 386-87 (proposing independence for immigration courts from the Department of 
Justice).  
 258 AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2-3. Notably, there is no 
description of this position on EOIR’s website. 
 259  See supra note 82. 
 260 AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 3; see also discussion supra 
note 82. The author attempted to clarify the role of the ACIJ for Conduct and 
Professionalism in a telephone interview with an official from EOIR Office of 
Legislative and Public Affairs. EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra 
note 219. The official confirmed the existence of the ACIJ for Conduct and 
Professionalism, which is listed on EOIR’s website and referenced in the April 11 
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda notes, but refused to elaborate on the actual role or duties 
of this ACIJ because the position is “new.” Id. 
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Ethics Review Board discussed in Part V.C and D, infra) to 
actually handle the complaints. 
The current disciplinary structure is therefore 
unsatisfactory on several levels. Because it lacks both 
transparency and methods for appeal, the structure is not 
sufficient to monitor ethical behavior on the part of IJs. 
Immigration judges working in fear of losing their jobs if they 
rule against the government will be less inclined to focus on 
ethics, and more inclined to focus on job security. Several 
additional reforms are necessary to monitor and ensure ethical 
judicial behavior in immigration courts.  
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
The crisis on the American immigration bench is 
evidenced by appellate court opinions condemning the conduct 
of immigration judges, studies demonstrating statistical 
inconsistencies in immigration decisions, and recurring stories 
of injustice reported by individual litigants.261 From an ethical 
perspective, this crisis has serious repercussions. In particular, 
biased and incompetent conduct on the part of immigration 
judges negatively impacts the lives of individuals seeking to 
remain in the United States. A larger issue is also at hand: 
without significant ethical reforms to ensure proper judicial 
conduct, the entire system of immigration adjudication is 
flawed. 
Together with circuit court judges, immigration judges 
are calling for increased resources to assist with their heavy 
workload.262 Legal scholars have also recommended specific 
changes designed to improve the structure of the immigration 
court system. For example, Sydenham Alexander suggested a 
campaign to publicly identify the “worst” IJs in order to remove 
them from the bench.263 Alexander’s campaign hopes to “change 
substantially the system that those judges will leave behind.”264 
In addition, Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and 
Schrag presented numerous recommendations focused on 
structural change. These suggestions included (1) bringing 
immigration adjudicators together to discuss the vast 
inconsistencies in asylum outcomes, (2) increased training for 
  
 261 See sources cited supra notes 8, 11, 149. 
 262 See Maclean, supra note 216. 
 263 Alexander, supra note 8, at 45-46.  
 264 Id. at 46. 
512 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
immigration judges with a focus on judicial temperament, (3) 
more rigorous hiring standards for EOIR, (4) more resources 
for immigration courts, including an increase in the number of 
immigration judges, and (5) appointed counsel provided by the 
government for any indigent asylum applicant litigating in 
immigration court.265 Each of these ideas has merit, and this 
author supports these scholars in calling for structural reform.  
Recognizing the urgency, Attorney General Gonzales 
promised reforms to address judicial misconduct in immigra-
tion courts. Many of the Attorney General’s initiatives are 
“internal,”266 and it is possible that significant changes are 
being implemented without publicity. Observers should closely 
watch EOIR and the DOJ to guarantee completion of these 
improvements.  
However, even if these changes are successfully 
implemented, additional reforms will remain necessary to 
resolve the crisis on the immigration bench. Because the  
focus of this article is judicial ethics, the reforms proposed 
herein are intended to specifically diminish judicial bias and 
incompetence. First, EOIR should recognize the ethical duty of 
overworked immigration judges to refrain from taking on new 
cases. In addition, EOIR should improve ethics training and 
create an Ethics Review Board to work in conjunction with the 
structural reforms discussed above. All three proposals would 
be cost effective and fairly simple to implement, in hopes that 
Justice Department officials will use them to continue 
reorganizing the structure of EOIR.267  
A. Ethical Obligation to Avoid Case Overloads  
The EOIR Codes of Conduct could serve as a means of 
support for immigration judges whose competence on the bench 
is negatively impacted by excessive workloads. The ABA 
recently declared that lawyers representing indigent criminal 
cases have an ethical obligation to refuse accepting new clients 
if an excessive caseload “prevents a lawyer from providing 
  
 265 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 380-89. 
 266 EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 219; see also 
Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,674 (stating 
that the Attorney General’s directives “are being implemented through internal 
management changes within EOIR”). 
 267 Some of these reform suggestions were submitted to the DOJ as public 
comments for the proposed Codes of Conduct on July 27, 2007. 
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competent and diligent representation to existing clients.”268 
Admittedly, this ABA Code provision is intended to apply to 
lawyers in advocacy positions, a role very different from the job 
of a neutral arbiter. However, the EOIR Codes of Conduct 
indicated EOIR’s intent to hold immigration judges accountable 
under the same standards of conduct as all attorneys in their 
state of license or in the state in which they sit on the bench, 
despite the fact that immigration judges and attorneys serve 
very different roles in the adversarial system.269  
If immigration judges are to be held to the same 
standards of conduct as attorneys, the EOIR Codes of Conduct 
should draw an analogy from the ABA rules: the EOIR Codes 
should provide that an overworked immigration judge without 
the time or resources necessary to decide cases in a thorough 
and competent manner has an ethical obligation to avoid 
taking on new cases.  
This provision would certainly be controversial in light 
of political and practical pressure to decide immigration cases 
expediently. Indeed, such action might require organization on 
the part of immigration judges themselves, much like public 
defenders going on strike to highlight their lack of resources.270 
If immigration judges refused to take more cases than they 
could fairly and adequately handle, their action would have two 
immediate effects: it would signal to the federal government 
that the problem of inadequate judicial resources is closely 
aligned with judicial competence, and it would empower 
immigration judges to publicly value ethical decision-making.271 
In this way, the proposed EOIR Codes of Conduct could 
potentially serve as catalysts inspiring further ethical reform.  
  
 268 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006); 
see also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002) (“A lawyer’s 
workload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”). 
 269 EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.  
 270 See Brandon Buskey, When Public Defenders Strike: Exploring How Public 
Defenders Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory to Become Effective Political 
Actors, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 533 (2007), available at http://www.hlrponline.com/ 
vol1no2/buskey.pdf.  
 271 The potential effectiveness of this reform strategy is worthy of further 
consideration. Note that IJs employing this technique would need to ensure their 
actions are interpreted as a justified cry for reform, rather than as an outright 
rebellion jeopardizing their job security.  
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B. Improved Ethics Training 
As it revises its code of conduct, EOIR must clarify the 
applicable ethical rules for immigration judges. It is simply 
unrealistic to expect an overworked group of judges to 
continuously follow changes in multiple sets of rules and 
guidelines. Strictly defining applicable ethical rules will enable 
judges to follow a clearer standard of conduct. 
This unified standard should be enhanced by improving 
training for immigration judges and BIA members on ethics-
related issues. Budgetary concerns have limited training 
conferences in recent years, including 2008,272 but the crisis in 
immigration courts demonstrates a renewed need for formal 
ethics training. 
At a minimum, immigration judges are currently 
required to attend one hour of training per year on ethics 
issues.273 EOIR recognized the need for additional training for 
immigration judges, and indicated its intent to provide 
“extended training” for immigration judges on “substantive 
legal issues” and “professionalism.”274 The EOIR Director’s  
job responsibilities now include providing “comprehensive, 
continuing training” for immigration judges to “promote the 
quality and consistency of adjudications.”275  
Assuming that a more specific version of the Codes of 
Conduct is in place, immigration judges should be trained to 
appreciate the importance of each of these codes. In addition to 
the training on judicial temperament suggested by Professors 
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag,276 IJs should be 
reminded that neutrality, competence, and general adherence 
to judicial ethics rules are critical parts of their jobs on the 
bench.  
  
 272 See discussion supra notes 112, 113. Immigration judges were “shocked 
and disappointed” to learn that the 2008 training had been cancelled and warned that 
“the results of this [cancellation], without some accommodations, would be disastrous.” 
NAIJ Letter, supra note 113. 
 273 5 C.F.R. § 2638.704 (2007). 
 274 AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2. 
 275 Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, at 53,677 (codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(vii) (2007)). Notably, the cancellation of the 2008 training 
conference for immigration judges “is in direct contravention to the measure of 
improved training announced by the Attorney General.” NAIJ Letter, supra note 113. 
 276 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 382 (recommending training for 
IJs to include “counseling on impartiality, avoiding stereotyping, and not taking 
personally the misconduct that the judges sometimes encounter from people who are 
desperate to remain in the United States”). 
2008] CRISIS ON THE IMMIGRATION BENCH 515 
Training need not only occur on the national level. Local 
offices should offer seminars on judicial ethics, much like 
continuing legal education training for practicing attorneys. In 
addition to the value for individual judges, the DOJ would gain 
valuable public relations benefits. In short, the implementation 
of improved formal ethics trainings would be a low-cost, but 
highly advantageous, reform for immigration judges. 
C. Creation of an EOIR Ethics Review Board 
In 2006, as part of his ongoing structural reforms in 
immigration courts, the Attorney General announced he would 
address the failings of the IJ disciplinary process by imple-
menting “improved complaint procedures for inappropriate 
conduct by adjudicators.”277 To adequately repair this process, 
the Attorney General should create an “Ethics Review Board” 
(“ERB”) to supervise the courtroom conduct of immigration 
judges. Using the clarified EOIR Codes of Conduct as a 
governing standard, the Ethics Review Board could hear 
complaints of inappropriate behavior brought by litigants, 
practitioners, circuit court judges, or members of the public. 
The ERB could then act to discipline judges for unethical 
behavior, with the understanding that a behavioral complaint 
will not impact the substantive outcome of an immigration 
judge’s decision.278 
D. Structure of the Ethics Review Board  
The ERB structure would consist of a panel of 
reviewers, with a system for appeals if either party disagrees 
with the ERB determination. The ERB structure would also 
provide for public accountability in the form of public reports. 
Useful analogies for this structure can be found in the process 
for adjudicating disciplinary complaints against federal judges 
and California state judges.  
  
 277 DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. The Attorney General delegated this 
duty to the EOIR Director. See Authorities Delegated to Director, supra note 38, at 
53,677 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1003.0 (b)(viii)).  
 278 The proper avenue for review of inappropriate behavior that substantially 
affects the outcome of the case is a legal appeal to the circuit courts. The ERB focus 
will be inappropriate judicial conduct unrelated to an applicant’s substantive claim. 
Similarly, the disciplinary structure for federal judges provides for dismissal if a 
complaint is “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 352 (b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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Federal judges, state judges and administrative law 
judges differ from immigration judges in notable ways, 
including the procedural differences in the appointment 
processes as discussed in Part II.B, supra. In addition, unlike 
judges working within the Judicial Branch, immigration judges 
operate under the Executive Branch of government. Despite 
these differences, federal judges, state judges, administrative 
law judges, and immigration judges all assume the role of a 
“neutral arbiter” in adjudicatory proceedings. Thus, specific 
elements of the federal and state judicial disciplinary structure 
could serve as effective models for the disciplinary structure for 
immigration judges.279 
1.  Analogy: Disciplinary Structure for the Federal 
Judiciary 
Federal judges must comply with the Code of Conduct 
for United States judges. The ethical standards embodied in 
the Code, which are intended to have a “preventive” effect, offer 
affirmative guidelines for appropriate judicial behavior.280 
Although the drafters of the Code did not intend that 
disciplinary action would be appropriate for every violation of 
the Code’s provisions, this Code “may provide standards of 
conduct for application” in disciplinary proceedings against 
federal judges.281 
The procedure to file complaints against federal judges 
for misconduct is governed by the “Judicial Councils Reform 
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.”282 Elements of this 
procedure serve as excellent models for a similar system for 
  
 279 An administrative law judge may be disciplined by his or her employing 
agency only for “good cause.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1989). To discipline an ALJ, the 
employing agency must initiate formal proceedings with an independent agency, the 
Merit Systems Protections Board. Id. 
 280 In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 281 CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES, supra note 108, Canon 1, Commentary. The 
standard for disciplinary procedures under the Act is whether a judge’s conduct was 
“prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the 
courts,” or whether a “federal judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by 
reason of a mental or physical disability.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2007). This disciplinary 
structure could be strengthened by specifically including violations of the Codes of 
Conduct for United States Judges as a basis for discipline. However, extended analysis 
of the disciplinary structure for the federal judiciary is beyond the scope of this article. 
 282 TERRY EASTLAND ET AL., ETHICS IN THE COURTS: POLICING BEHAVIOR IN 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest) (1990). Nine 
years later, Congress enacted the “Ethics Reform Act,” which regulates the 
extrajudicial conduct of judges. Id. The Act is now codified in Title 28 of the United 
States Code. 
2008] CRISIS ON THE IMMIGRATION BENCH 517 
immigration judges, particularly regarding the methods of 
appeal for persons filing complaints and multi-member panels 
of reviewers addressing complaints.  
Under the Act, a person wishing to bring a charge 
against a federal judge under this standard may file a 
complaint with the clerk of the court of appeals, who then 
reports the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit.283 The 
initial responsibility to investigate complaints lies with the 
chief judge, who must review all complaints and may conduct a 
“limited inquiry.”284 After reviewing the complaint, the chief 
judge may dismiss the complaint, resolve it informally, or 
appoint a special committee to investigate the allegations.285 
This procedure is similar to the current disciplinary 
procedure for immigration judges, in which an ACIJ with 
supervisory authority reviews and acts upon allegations of 
misconduct. Unlike the current IJ procedure, however, the 
disciplinary inquiry for federal judges does not end with a 
single individual’s determination. Rather, if either party 
disagrees with the chief judge’s resolution of a complaint, 
review is available to the Judicial Council of the circuit.  
The Judicial Council may then act in a number of ways, 
including ordering additional investigation, dismissing the 
complaint, ordering that no new cases be assigned to the 
misbehaving judge, and censuring or reprimanding the judge 
either publicly or privately.286 A party disagreeing with the 
action taken by the Judicial Council has yet another layer of 
appeal, for any party may petition the Judicial Conference of 
the United States to hear the case.287 In addition, members of 
the Judicial Council may themselves refer a complaint to the 
  
 283 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2000). This provision applies to circuit judges, district 
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. Id. § 351(d). Congress mandated 
that the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit establish similar procedures for the filing of complaints 
“with respect to the conduct of any judge of such court and for the investigation and 
resolution of such complaints.” 28 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).  
 284 28 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000).  
 285 Id. §§ 352, 353.  
 286 28 U.S.C. § 354 (2000). Notably, § 354 details various actions which may be 
taken by the Judicial Council, but imposes limits on the Judicial Council regarding 
removals. Id. § 354(a)(3). The Judicial Council does not have the power to remove an 
Article III judge from the bench. Id. § 354 (a)(3)(A).  
 287 Id. § 357.  
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Judicial Conference of the United States if the case requires 
further disciplinary action.288 
Thus, a disciplinary complaint against a federal judge 
may be subject to several layers of appeal. Congress’s clearly 
organized procedures relating to the investigation of 
misbehaving federal judges indicates its concern about judicial 
ethics. In contrast to the ambiguity experienced by 
complainants filing behavioral allegations against immigration 
judges, complaints and investigative procedures for the federal 
judiciary are well developed and opinions of Judicial Councils 
are publicly available.289 Accordingly, the disciplinary process 
for federal judges serves as a useful model to reform EOIR’s 
complaint procedures.  
2.  Analogy: Disciplinary Process for California  
State Judges 
Article III judges enjoy life tenure, which places them in 
a different situation than both state judges and immigration 
judges. Thus, while certain components of the disciplinary 
procedure for Article III judges should be applied to 
immigration judges, the disposition of complaints against 
judges should be handled differently. California’s judicial 
disciplinary process adjudicates complaints against state 
judges in a manner placing a premium on accountability, a 
method which should be adopted by EOIR.  
The State of California Commission on Judicial 
Performance (“CJP”) receives complaints from “anyone”—
including litigants, lawyers, members of the public, other 
judges, and court staff.290 Unlike the complaint process at 
EOIR, every person who files a complaint with the CJP will 
receive notification in writing of the CJP’s action on a 
complaint.291 After the CJP investigates a complaint, “the 
Commission has several options.”292 If the investigation 
revealed no misconduct on the part of the judge, the CJP will 
  
 288 Id. § 354(b)(1). If the Judicial Council determines that a judge’s action may 
constitute grounds for impeachment, or is not amenable to resolution by the Judicial 
Council, the Council must refer the case to the Judicial Conference. Id. § 354(b)(2). 
 289 See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 290 State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, How to File a Complaint, 
http://cjp.ca.gov/filingacomp.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
 291 Id. 
 292 State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, Action the Commission Can 
Take, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/2001cases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
2008] CRISIS ON THE IMMIGRATION BENCH 519 
close the case and notify the complainant of the dismissal.293 If 
minor misconduct was discovered on the part of the judge, the 
CJP could “issue an ‘advisory letter’ to the judge,” advising 
caution or expressing disapproval of the conduct at issue.294 For 
more serious misconduct, the CJP may issue a “private 
admonishment,” which is designed “to bring problems to a 
judge’s attention at an early stage in the hope that the 
misconduct will not be repeated or escalate.”295 These 
confidential proceedings are not released to the public.  
For very serious misconduct, the California judicial 
disciplinary process uses public disclosure to hold judges 
accountable. Cases involving persistent and pervasive 
misconduct may result in a “public admonishment,” or the 
more serious “public censure.”296 Public admonishments and 
public censures are both notifications describing the conduct 
and the CJP’s findings, which are sent to the judge and also 
made available to the press and the public.297 This system 
emphasizes public accountability: since state judges are public 
officials, the public has the right to know when judges are 
misbehaving.  
A similar public accountability system should be 
instituted for immigration judges accused of serious 
misconduct. Public admonishment or public censure for 
immigration judges engaging in egregious unethical behavior 
would add an effective layer of accountability to EOIR’s judicial 
structure, particularly in light of renewed public attention on 
judicial misconduct.  
E. Proposed Disciplinary Structure for Immigration Judges 
The creation of an Ethics Review Board adopting 
elements of the disciplinary process for federal judges and 
California state judges would provide much-needed clarity to 
EOIR’s disciplinary process. First, the standards of ethical 
conduct for immigration judges should be simplified: 
complaints should be based upon violations of revised and more 
specific Codes of Conduct. Persons wishing to allege violations 
  
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. Judges have the right to ask the California Supreme Court “to review 
an admonishment, censure, removal or involuntary retirement determination.” Id.  
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of the Codes may file a complaint with the EOIR Ethics Review 
Board. To remedy the concerns raised by allowing one person 
with supervisory authority to review and dismiss a complaint, 
the ERB should consist of a five to nine member panel. In this 
way, enforcement of the Codes of Conduct would be the 
responsibility of a third-party panel. A panel review with a 
detached group of individuals is a more appropriate method of 
handling complaints, since a “panel is less likely to make a 
mistake than is a single [individual].”298 
The members of the ERB would conduct an 
investigation similar to the inquiry undertaken by a federal 
chief judge in response to a complaint. Based on this inquiry, 
following California’s model, the ERB could have several 
options for disposition of the complaint. The ERB could (1) 
dismiss the complaint, (2) resolve the complaint informally 
through mediation or another form of alternative dispute 
resolution, (3) take action on a complaint through an advisory 
letter or private admonishment, or (4) reprimand an IJ for 
serious misconduct through public admonishment or public 
censure.  
Regardless of the ERB’s determination, two factors 
must be present. First, if either party disagrees with the ERB’s 
resolution, appeal must be available. Like the petition for 
review of a federal chief judge’s decision to the Judicial Council, 
the ERB’s resolution should be appealable to the EOIR Office of 
General Counsel. This process deliberately skips the current 
evaluators of complaints against immigration judges (the ACIJ, 
OCIJ, and EOIR Director), since their failure to adequately 
enforce proper behavior on the immigration bench has 
contributed to the current ethical crisis. The EOIR Office of 
General Counsel may refer a complaint alleging misconduct to 
the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility or the Office of 
the Inspector General. Alternatively, either party seeking a 
final review should file an appeal to the Office of the Attorney 
General, who holds ultimate responsibility for the actions of 
immigration judges.  
Second, to alleviate the uncertainty of the current 
process for complainants, the ERB must create a written record 
of its investigation and decision-making process. This detailed 
record need not be made available to the public, but should be 
  
 298 Cruz, supra note 11, at 507.  
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accessible to the complaining party and the judge whose 
conduct is in question.  
If the ERB chooses to reprimand an IJ through public 
admonishment or public censure, much like California’s 
disciplinary system, the names of these judges should be 
available on the EOIR website. In addition, a statistical report 
regarding complaints of unethical misconduct against 
immigration judges must be made public for accountability 
purposes. This public report could take the form of California’s 
CJP statistics, which compile the numbers of new complaints 
considered by the CJP, investigations commenced, and 
ultimate dispositions of cases.299 California also compiles 
summaries of actions taken against state judges describing the 
details of misconduct resulting in discipline.300 These annual 
summaries are useful for judges concerned about avoiding 
discipline for similar behavior. Privacy concerns could prevent 
the full, detailed investigation record of the ERB from being 
publicly released. At a minimum, however, public reports 
should include information regarding how many complaints of 
ethical misconduct are filed each year against immigration 
judges, examples of the types of complaints filed, and how such 
complaints are resolved. 
F. Benefits of Ethics Review Board 
The creation of an Ethics Review Board would provide 
several benefits to the DOJ. Like the complaint procedure for 
federal judges under the Judicial Councils Act, this system 
offers several methods of appeal and multiple reviewers for 
each complaint filed, ensuring that complaints are handled 
properly. Also, IJs will be aware that unethical behavior, 
particularly biased behavior against litigants, will have public 
consequences. The mere possibility of public accountability 
could be enough to deter some judges from acting in an 
unethical manner, for the threat of public embarrassment will 
likely encourage most IJs to act more carefully on the bench. 
As judicial performance improves, litigants may be less 
inclined to file appeals to the BIA and circuit courts. In this 
  
 299 See CJP, 10-Year Summary of Commission Activity, http://cjp.ca.gov/ 
TenYearStats.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).  
 300 See CJP, 2006 Private Discipline Summaries, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/ 
2001privdisc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008); CJP, 2006 Public Discipline, 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/commcases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
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way, a more ethical judiciary at the IJ level could help alleviate 
the “surge” in the circuit courts.301  
Perhaps more importantly, those IJs who continue to 
act improperly will actually be held accountable for their 
behavior. Rather than relying on the circuit courts, reporters, 
or legal scholars to identify “bad apples” among IJs and BIA 
members, EOIR and the DOJ could recognize, discipline, and 
remove biased or incompetent judges before their behavior 
impacts large numbers of applicants. As a result, the ethical 
integrity of immigration judges and BIA members would 
noticeably improve.  
In addition, this improved layer of accountability serves 
a separate purpose for the Justice Department: sorely needed 
public relations benefits. Creating an Ethics Review Board, in 
addition to enhanced ethics training for judges, would 
demonstrate the DOJ’s renewed commitment to ensuring 
ethical conduct. Moreover, if litigants entering immigration 
courts know they will be guaranteed a “professional manner”302 
and “impartial treatment,”303 and also know that a systematic 
method for complaints is available if they encounter otherwise, 
a more positive public perception of EOIR and its judges could 
be restored.  
Creation of an Ethics Review Board would also be cost 
effective. There is no need to hire large numbers to staff the 
ERB; indeed, a five- to nine-member panel would be sufficient 
as a start. Lawyers from the DOJ Office of Government Ethics, 
who are trained in ethics standards and advise attorneys 
throughout the department on ethical issues, would be well 
suited for the position. Alternatively, the ERB could consist of a 
variety of members—including practitioners or advocates from 
both sides of the immigration debate—to assure a balanced 
consideration of complaints. Also, members would serve one to 
two-year terms on the ERB, to minimize the time commitment 
required for each member. The low-cost creation of a small 
board, guaranteeing accountability for judges’ violations of 
EOIR’s own Codes of Conduct, will go a long way toward 
restoring the fairness and integrity of the immigration system.  
  
 301 Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 2012 (circuit courts are taking time to 
“graphically expose the unfortunate number of glaringly defective decisions” rendered 
by IJs). With more ethical behavior on the bench, the number of “glaringly defective” 
decisions will hopefully decrease, freeing the circuit courts to consider more 
substantive legal issues.  
 302 EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon X. 
 303 Id. Canon VI. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The crisis in the immigration courts warrants 
examination from the perspective of judicial ethics. Increasing 
reports of biased or incompetent conduct on the immigration 
bench raise particular concerns about the ability of the 
immigration court system to properly adjudicate cases. But 
these pervasive ethical problems also present an unparalleled 
opportunity for reform.  
The Attorney General’s pending proposals to redress 
improper conduct on the part of immigration judges indicates 
recognition of the problem and government willingness to 
improve. However, some of the pending reforms, such as the 
EOIR Codes of Conduct, suffer from significant flaws 
undermining their power to ensure unbiased and competent 
behavior on the immigration bench.  
Numerous effective reform proposals have been 
articulated in recent months, and this author joins legal 
scholars, appellate judges, and practitioners in supporting 
structural changes.304 To reframe the ongoing discussion from 
an ethical perspective, this article proposes three practical 
reforms designed to actively promote ethical conduct for 
immigration judges. For a start, the EOIR Codes of Conduct 
could be used as a springboard to address challenges facing 
immigration judges, such as excessive caseloads. Genuine 
improvement will also require the investment of more time and 
money for training courses on judicial ethics. Additionally, a 
panel of reviewers in the form of an Ethics Review Board  
will develop accountability and consequences for judicial 
misconduct. The ERB will take responsibility for monitoring 
complaints away from a single individual, and place the burden 
more fairly on a multi-member panel. Such changes would 
benefit not only individuals litigating in immigration court, but 
would also signify the Department of Justice’s renewed 
commitment to ethical conduct in the courtroom. It is hoped 
that expanded recognition of the ethical repercussions of this 
crisis will soon translate into meaningful change—for litigants 
like Mr. Tun and Mr. Elias, and for immigration judges seeking 
to do their jobs well.  
  
 304 See sources cited in supra note 11; see also supra Part V.  
